William E. Thornton
Lydia Voigt
working document prepared for the
Downtown Development District
601 Poydras Street, Suite 1975
New Orleans, LA
Public CCTV Surveillance System: A Review of the
Issues
American Public
Surveillance Systems
Scant research evidence exists to show the effectiveness of public CCTV
systems in preventing or otherwise deterring criminal activity on public
streets and thoroughfares in American cities. A reason for this lack of data is
that while CCTV surveillance systems have been used extensively in commercial
establishments for many years, chiefly to detect shoplifters and to monitor
store employees, few cities in the United States have installed public
surveillance systems. The first public uses of video surveillance systems were
in the cities of Hoboken, New Jersey in 1966 and in Mount Vernon, New York in
1971. These systems were small in scope, with fewer than half a dozen cameras
in each city, and encompassed geographical business and shopping areas of about
a block size. Reports suggest that impact on crime was minimal in each city and
the systems were dismantled within three years of installation. Other cities
such as Newark, New Jersey, Charleston, West Virginia and Miami Beach, Florida
have experimented with very small numbers of cameras over the last ten years
monitoring heavy pedestrian flow streets in key business areas. Any direct
impact of these CCTV systems on criminal activity in monitored areas appears
questionable, and there is evidence that in Miami, the police became
disenchanted with the system because of the impact on manpower and the
prohibitive costs to maintain the system.
At this juncture in time,
it is probably unfair to be highly critical of public CCTV surveillance systems
in American cities as a form of crime control because of their infrequent and
limited use. Past efforts have been small in scope, poorly integrated into
existing law enforcement infrastructures, and ill defined as to their presumed
effectiveness. Currently, a few cities in the U.S. such as Virginia Beach and
Baltimore are installing larger CCTV systems which are part of their broader
public safety plans.
No base data is available
which measures the success of these systems. Baltimore's
"Video Patrol"
has been planned with considerable thought given to the evaluation of the
project. However, unlike many surveillance systems, the Baltimore system is
based on 24 hour video monitoring of sites rather than permanently staffed
operators viewing camera monitors. Rather than relying on simple before and
after measures of increases or decreases of criminal activity in the sixteen
square block target area, market surveys will be given to samples of citizens
to register their perceived safety. Other perceptions related to shopping
patterns serving as indicators of business retention and growth are likewise to
be linked to the effectiveness of cameras (Video Patrols Downtown Streets, nd.:
3).
Special Duty Use
Although large public or
city wide CCTV systems are rare in the United States, there have been numerous
"special duty" uses of remote cameras employed by municipalities,
business development groups, and neighborhood watchdog associations. These
special duty uses often involve the use of closed circuit cameras: (1) to
monitor traffic on city streets and on the interstate belt lines around cities;
(2) to monitor subway corridors and other mass transit routes for vandalism and
the safety of passengers; (3) to monitor high vandalism and burglary areas at
remote sites such as city parks and monuments; and (4) to monitor and to deter
drug dealers from setting up shop in public housing and other high crime areas.
These specialized uses of closed circuit cameras have reports of some success
(O'Mahoney, 1990). In Hollywood, California after hundreds of reports by
citizens about motorists being boldly approached by drug dealers offering rock
cocaine and other drugs, in 1995 a coalition of police and landlords installed
cameras on the outside of apartment buildings and overt drug dealing decreased
substantially. Preliminary reports indicate that both drug buyers and drug
dealers were apprehended in significantly large numbers due to evidence gained
through the use of cameras. Signs announcing "Buy Drugs and Go to
Jail" and "Entering Videotape Surveillance Zones" went up on
Yucca Street, near the legendary Hollywood Boulevard and the landmark Mann's
Chinese Theater. The surveillance program, however, has recently come under
review by the ACLU because the chief means that the police apprehended drug
dealers and buyers was by identifying them by license plate numbers captured on
tapel (Associated Press, 2/20/96). ACLU claims that such programs potentially
violate 4th and 1st Amendment rights of citizens.
The British Experience
with Public CCTV
An estimated 120 towns and
cities throughout Great Britain are now using CCTV technology for public area
surveillance as an integral part of their crime prevention and crime control
efforts. It is from the British experience that we can take advice and learn
from their many years of trial and error in designing, maintaining, and
monitoring open area closed circuit televisions. It is important to remember,
however, that British CCTV systems are rather small, averaging no more than 25
to 50 cameras in most towns and cities.
First introduced in
shopping centers and parking lots in the early 1970s, and later expanded to
city streets, more than half of all metropolitan and non‑metropolitan
councils have installed CCTV in their town centers (central business areas).
Results from studies conducted by criminologists, the British Police Research
Group, and security experts indicate that CCTV can under certain
circumstances make a useful contribution to crime control in cities.
Surprisingly, empirical studies of the effectiveness of public CCTV on .British
crime remains sparse. At least one recent study conducted by Speed et al (1995)
suggests that the lack of empirical evidence for the effect of cameras on
overall crime levels, especially thefts, has caused British retailers, who have
been large contributors in support of public CCTV schemes, to question their
effectiveness in the business community. Much of the initial impetus for British
public CCTV came from the business communities who were very much concerned
over the phenomenon known as "city center avoidance", referring to
the fact that that shoppers and tourists were often reluctant to frequent
downtown shopping centers due to a growing fear of crime (Poole and Williams,
1996: 3).
Perhaps what the British experience with public CCTV
informs us is that this technology is not a panacea or magic bullet which can
substantially reduce criminal activity outside the parameters of other forms of
social control agents (e.g., well trained law enforcement personnel, private
security initiatives by businesses, etc. ) (Brown, 1995). In fact, the public
in Britain did not initially accept CCTV cameras in public areas.
However, a series of public disorder events
throughout the 1970s and 1980s including inner city race riots, national coal
miner strikes, and "football hooliganism" all contributed to citizen
frustration with crime. After the April, 1989 Hillsborough Football Stadium soccer
riot in Sheffield where ninety‑two people were crushed to death, a
national study from the Home Office recommended that surveillance technology be
placed in all football stadiums (Poole and Williams, 1996: 29). Success at
monitoring and controlling these sports events has to a large degree stimulated
the use of public CCTV throughout the country. The British Home Office has
routinely provided government funding to stimulate towns and cities to install
public CCTV. The latest CCTV Challenge Competition awarded over $15 million
dollars to 106 towns who had successfully submitted proposals for either new
CCTV installation or updating of existing equipment. The goal of the British
Government is to place 10,000 additional cameras on public streets in the next
three years (Home ,Office Press Release, May 2, 1996).
While
it is safe to say that the British have fully embraced the concept of public
cameras in their "war on crime', it is difficult to access the
effectiveness of CCTV cameras in British cities. This is so because cameras
contribute only one aspect of a city's overall crime control resources. Since
many other factors affect crime trends, it is difficult to sort out the
relative impact of any one factor such as the direct effects of CCTV Moreover,
the presence of CCTV cameras may have different impacts on crime patterns
depending on the other crime control activities they are a part of or the
nature within different environments where they are introduced (Brown, 1995:
9).
It is also important to remember that the success of
cameras in having a particular impact on some outcome may vary by such things
as: (1) density and use patterns of different locations; (2) amount of police
and private security coverage in a given area; (3) expertise of individuals
monitoring the equipment; (4) length of time that the cameras have been in
operation; (5) number and location of cameras; (5) time of year; and (6)
professionalism and management success of responding law enforcement agency.
Most British evaluation studies focus on two outcomes
as indicators of success after cameras are installed: (1) reduction of property
and interpersonal crimes; and (2) reduction of citizen fear of crime. A recent
study of three cities employing public surveillance systems ‑ Newcastle,
Birmingham, and King's Lynn in Norfolk ‑ reveal several interesting
findings in relation to the objectives:
(1) When cameras are first installed in a given geographical area,
they tend to have the strongest deterrent effect on a wide range of crimes. But
the effects of cameras on crime often tend to diminish over time. Thus in order
to sustain the effect of the cameras on particular offenses, the cameras must
be used aggressively to increase the risk of arrest for offenders. Likewise,
renewed publicity over the presence of cameras must take place.
(2) In all three cities, there is
evidence to suggest that the use of cameras has
reduced property crime, especially burglary. Some
reductions were seen in other offenses but particularly theft of and from motor
vehicles. The cameras apparently had little impact on general thefts from
businesses.
(3) The effect of cameras on person crime is unimpressive. In the
larger metropolitan areas, the cameras seem to have had considerably less
impact on overall levels of public order and assault offenses. It appears
that the cameras' strengths in dealing with assaults lies not in their
prevention, especially assaults initiated by alcohol which are impulsive by
nature, but rather in coordinating a quick response from the police to break up
the altercation before it becomes more serious.
(4) There appears to be rather limited success of the use of the
cameras in recording evidence that can be used in the prosecution of offenders.
(5) In those cities such as Birmingham with comprehensive camera
coverage, there is some evidence that robberies have been controlled and even
decreased, but there is also evidence to suggest that these offenders have been
displaced to other near‑by areas outside camera coverage.
(6) The Birmingham study examined the publics' fear of crime before
and after installation of the cameras and found that people who were aware of
the cameras felt safer on city streets after dark after the cameras were first
introduced. The enhanced safety effect was, however, not found to exist for
those people who regularly used the city streets at night (who were probably
less fearful anyway) or for those people who were unaware of the cameras
(Brown, 1995).
General Overview of
Research on the Uses of CCTV
Based on close to twenty years of British experiences
(and some limited American experiences) with public CCTV, several salient
points emerge which can no doubt be of use to cities such as New Orleans who
are now contemplating installation of a public camera system. These are:
(1) Camera
systems shoul be fully integrated into I lice operations and should
be used to assist decision
making in the deployment of officers and how best
to deploy a response to
incidents.
(2) A high degree of camera coverage (e.g. well placed
cameras and/or pan/tilt/zoom lens, numerous cameras) is required to make any
impact on criminal and other untoward public activity
(3) There should be careful monitoring of possible
crime displacement into adjacent areas where there is no camera coverage.
(4) Monitoring of cameras can be done by a police personnel or civilian personnel or a
combination of both but careful attention must be given to the training of
monitors (Le... how to observe unlawful events and how t‑o report or
respond to the police about criminal events)
(5) Precise codes of practice must be established and
made known before the system is activated. Codes of practice should he formulated
with legal guidance to avoid liability lawsuits
(6) The CCTV system needs to be well publicized both
to reduce fear of crime and to alert potential law violators.
(7) A precise management
team must be gut together to be responsible for the
aeration and maintenance of
the system A clear chain of command of
responsibility must be
put into Mace before the system is installed
and realistic annual
cost projections of the system must be worked out before any system is
approved. Large number of cameras systems shut down within about three wears of
their installation because of
poor cost operation figures (see
Brown 1995 Edwards and TilIy 1994 Honess and Charman. 1992 Tilly, 1993).
Important Questions to
Consider Prior to Installing Systems
CCTV vendors and
technicians who design and install cameras and monitoring equipment generally
gloss over important questions which must be considered when a municipality is
contemplating installing a public CCTV system.
To the question, Why do
you want the system in the first place?, common responses may be "to
reduce crime", "to reduce fear of crime', "other cities have
them, why not us?", etc. Unfortunately these responses which appear
straightforward must be considered in terms of concrete expectations and
realistic results.
It is essential that
clearly defined and measurable outcomes for the public CCTV system in a city be
delineated at the very beginning of a project and certainly before technical
plans are drawn up and bid out. For
example, exactly what do the underwriters of the system want from the
installation and monitoring of the system? Is it reduction in crime? If so,
what types of crime (e.g., thefts, public disorder offenses, auto burglaries,
auto thefts, etc.)? Is the geographical area(s) where the cameras are going in
prone to certain types of crime? Has this been documented? Has a thorough
crime analysis or risk assessment of the targeted
areas been completed before the technical plan has been devised or has the
technical plan been superseded by a political agenda? Has the business
community been queried about the proposed system and what it may cost them in the
long run?
The importance of clearly stated reasons and desired outcomes for a
surveillance system cannot be underestimated. At some point in time, the
effectiveness of the system must be evaluated to see if it is accomplishing
what it was initially proposed to do. If not, the system may need to be
revised, altered, or eliminated. Unfortunately, several American cities that
have installed early public surveillance systems have discontinued them after
short periods of operation for a variety of reasons ‑ cost, no
significant reduction in criminal activity, and lack of integration into
traditional law enforcement being the chief reasons.
A review of the literature on public CCTV reveals
that municipalities both in the U.S., and abroad are in somewhat common agreement
on what they want these systems to do. In actual practice, however, the end
results of the effectiveness of public monitoring systems remains generally
vague, especially in relation to the money and human resources put into the
systems. Commonly stated rationales and assumptions for these systems include:
(1) Crime
deterrence: It is presumed that common knowledge of the presence of these
cameras and their monitoring will deter potential offenders from committing
certain types of offenses. Fact: Not all criminals seem to be deterred by the
presence of cameras. By and large, minor property
offenders may be deterred or displaced by cameras in some instances.
(Shoplifting continues to be a serious problem in retail stores that have used
video surveillance systems for years.)
(2) Reduction in citizen fear of crime: It is presumed that
citizens who frequent central business districts in cities with monitored
public cameras will somehow feel safer, shop more frequently and revitalize
those areas which have experienced "center city avoidance." Fact:
Under some conditions citizen perception of fear of crime lessens with CCTV if
it well publicized and backed up by a visible police or security presence.
(3) Criminal incident monitoring: It is presumed that when
offenses are viewed and recorded on camera, that the police can respond in a
timely manner and defuse an event before someone gets hurt. Fact: The recording
aspect of public surveillance systems seems to be the least effective part of
the system. Real time monitoring by trained observers and quick police response
time to a crime in progress appear to be
_ key strengths of these
systems. However, advertising that a surveillance
system is being
monitored by operators for twenty four hours and then
failing to live up to
that expectation invites "failure to perform" civil
litigation when a
citizen is victimized and no r response is forthcoming!
(4) Evidential recording: It is presumed that when offenders are recorded on camera in the act of committing a crime that more arrests can be made, that better evidence can be obtained, and that more convictions can be obtained. Fact: For certain types of property offenders captured in the act of committing crimes, under some circumstances, increases in arrests have been obtained. The "making„ of cases via recorded evidence and subsequent successful convictions is weak and questionable.
(5) Site management: It is presumed that well placed cameras on
heavily
used
streets can monitor traffic flows, special events, and natural and man
made
disasters. Fact: CCTV surveillance systems have been very
effective
in monitoring traffic in many cities. Likewise, special event
monitoring
(e.g., sports events, parades, etc.) has been successful. Little
data
exists regarding the usefulness of CCTV in natural or manmade
disaster
monitoring. (It would logically follow that certain types of
offenses
associated with natural and manmade disasters such as looting
of
businesses could be controlled with public surveillance systems
and
well linked police.)
(6) Personnel monitoring: It is presumed that cameras can
monitor
law
enforcement and other security personnel with respect to the lawful
(and
possible unlawful) fulfillment of their duties. In other words,
monitoring
systems can be used as an effective management tool.
Fact:
Little or no evidence supports this assumption.
(7) Effective law
enforcement tool: It is presumed that law enforcement
will
embrace this surveillance technology as an effective tool in crime
prevention
and control. Fact: Little or no research has really examined
the
police acceptance of public surveillance systems and how it has
been
used in regular police procedures. In well managed British
police departments,
there is some evidence that the cameras have been successfully integrated into
police operations. The integration of these systems in poorly managed and
understaffed American police departments remains open to question?
Criteria Used to
Evaluate the Success of CCTV Systems
Evaluation
research ‑ sometimes referred to as program evaluation ‑ assesses
the impact of public CCTV on desired outcomes. In its simplest form, evaluation
research is a process of determining whether the intended results of a CCTV
system, in this case an initial trial system of 32 cameras along the Canal
Street corridor, will have an impact on desired outcomes. A technical plan for
the initial pilot surveillance program has been devised with only
"marginal" attention given to the desired outcomes of the system. For
example, no indepth crime analysis or risk assessment, to our knowledge, has
been done for the proposed target area. Historical crime data suggests that the
Canal Street section to be monitored probably accounts for no more than 40
percent of the "calls for service" in that district for any given
year. This being the case, the surveillance system is not being placed in what
may be considered a "high" crime area of the CBD; and, it is
conceivable that "significant" crime reduction may not be an outcome
of this surveillance system.
Consideration should be given to how the system will
be evaluated and who will do the evaluations and at what time intervals? What
are the expected outcome and response variables, and how will these be operationalized and measured ? As the
British experience with public CCTV has shown, there are probably multiple
effects, some of which are latent or unintended, of these surveillance systems.
It would be prudent, therefore, for the underwriters of the proposed system to
consider multiple outcomes of success for the New Orleans system. Below are
some possible criteria which could be used to gauge the success of the New
Orleans system:
(1) statistically
significant reduction in certain property crimes (e.g., thefts, purse
snatchings, auto burglaries, auto thefts);
(2)
statistically significant reduction in interpersonal stranger‑on‑stranger
crimes (e.g.,
assaults, armed robberies);
(3) statistically significant reductions
in public order crimes (e.g., public drunks, solicitation);
(4) statistically significant
reductions in drug related crimes (e.g., dealing);
(5) statistically significant reduction
in vandalism/graffiti/destruction of property crimes;
(6) increases
in arrests for property and interpersonal crimes;
(7) significant number of
evidential recordings used in making criminal cases;
(8) enhanced public perception of safety ‑
via surveys, interviews, people who frequent targeted areas, etc.;
(9) merchant and retail perceived
satisfaction as evidenced by: (1) increases in sales; (2) new customer bases;
(3) less complaints from customers; (4) new businesses moving into area, etc.;
(10) offender perception ‑interviews
with known offenders about their `fear" of detection by cameras;
(11) increased numbers of
tourists in the CBD and surrounding areas;
(12) more positive press/ media
coverage of New Orleans locally and nationally;
(13) police belief and
acceptance that the surveillance system is a good law
enforcement tool as evidenced
by: (1) performance appraisals;
(2) interviews with line/street
officers; (3) independent non‑police appraisal
of the operation of the system.
Ultimately, the criteria of success and failure of the surveillance program is a matter of agreement. It is probably very realistic to have multiple measures of outcomes for the success of the system. The people responsible for the program may commit themselves in advance to particular outcomes that will be regarded as an indication of success.
Operational, Management and Technical Aspects of the
System
In this section of the paper, we review what appear to be the major
issues in the management, operation, and selection of technical equipment of
public surveillance systems.
Codes of Practice
Central to any successful surveillance system is a clearly defined
"code of practice" and standard operatinng procedures. In addition to
ensuring that the system is operated in an ethical manner, adherence to a code
of practice can mitigate liability charges when negligent operation of the
system is called into question. Major questions addressed in a code of practice
include: (1) What things can and cannot be recorded?; (2) Who should view
tapes?; (3) Where should tapes be stored?, How long should they be stored?, and
What security measures are needed to ensure their protection?; and (4) What
procedures should be followed when hard copies are made of video tape material?
Model codes of practice have been devised by the British; these may serve as a
point of origin for the proposed New Orleans system.
Legal council should examine the code of practice
with regard to controversial or liability issues not limited to but including:
(1) reasonable expectations of the public's expectation of privacy; (2)
evidential issues connected to 4th amendment prohibitions of unreasonable
searches and seizures; (3) the use of video camera enhancement devices
(telescopic zoom lenses) and the "plain view doctrine"; (4) 1st
Amendment issues of guarantees of free speech and association ‑ when
cameras are used to monitor special events such as controversial political
gatherings (see Granholm, 198).
Many problems can be avoided by having clear
objectives for the surveillance system stated in the codes of practice.
Mechanisms to handle unforeseen issues should be put in place; e.g., such as
the establishment of a "Video Surveillance Advisory Board" which
would function to determine any other uses of the system
not stated in the objectives section of the codes of practice.
Monitoring Practices
Whether applied in a commercial or public setting, one of the biggest problems
in the effective use of CCTV technology is the human factor of observing or
"monitoring" the images that emanate from the cameras. Some of the
newer American public surveillance systems, such as in Baltimore, have opted
not to have operators monitoring cameras live on a twenty four hour basis but
rather record events and use live monitors, police officers and private
security personnel, to "video patrol" on a "per need" or
random basis. This practice can save municipalities from later "failure to
perform" civil litigation suits and is probably also the most reasonable
way to cut down on the prohibitive costs of round the clock live camera
operators. Serious consideration should be given to this aspect of the public
CCTV system in New Orleans. Past systems in other cities have failed not
because of the costs of initial equipment, but because of personnel costs.
If a system is set up to be live monitored for long
periods of time, and that legal duty to provide "reasonable and
adequate" surveillance and appropriate responses are undertake, good staff
must be trained to observe. Key points to be considered are:
(1) What can be expected of operators?
(2) What
type of training do they need?
(3) Should monitors be
commissioned police officers or civilians?
(4) How and when should they look at live transmissions?
‑ viewing in two hour intervals with short breaks appears to be an
industry standard.
(5) How, when and under what circumstances should they
look at recorded material
(6) Should operators monitor 8, 12, 24 or some other
combinations of hours? Should operators only monitor randomly or on some other
per need basis? (If police are used and equipment are in district stations,
officers may "video patrol" their beats on a random basis during shifts.)
(8) What
are the vigilance problems?
(9) How
many screens can be watched during specific time intervals?
Experience with public
surveillance systems suggests that differences exist when compared to smaller,
commercial establishment systems. Generally, public systems monitor much larger
numbers of individuals involved in a diverse number of activities (e.g.,
consider Mardi Gras). For example, rather than panning a camera for potential
shoplifters in a department store, a public monitor is on the watch for any
number of illegal activities, some of which require some knowledge of criminal
law to even know that an offense has taken place. Judgment calls about when to
communicate to the police that a crime is in progress (as simply opposed to
'strange behavior") later become extremely important when potential
charges of false arrest or illegal confinement are made by citizens.
Research suggests that operators become accustomed to
certain routine activities in given geographical areas monitored by cameras.
Thus, at certain times they may be more vigilant or alert because of some
expected event. For example, monitors may come to know that "Camera Number
3", which pans a certain stretch of street with a public bus stop, will
pick up hundreds of high school students who are coming home from school on RTA
buses. The temporary increase in population on the street at this time each
school day may increase the potential for criminal and public order types of
offenses. It is possible, then, that monitoring "routines" will develop out
of practice which will help clarify initial questions about how much real time
monitoring is necessary in a given 12 or 24 hour period.
Evidence
suggests that monitors go through a process of "incident" management
composed of three "stages":
(1) Incident
Detection Stage: In this stage, a condition that is not normal for the time
period or location is detected. The nature of the problem may or may not be
confirmed, depending on the source of detection. This stage may take a few
seconds or several minutes.
(2) Incident
Identification Stage: The actual
occurrence of an unusual condition is determined and the nature of the occurrence is identified during this
stage.
This may occur concurrently with the detection stage or may take several
additional minutes of time.
(3) Incident
Handling Stage: It is during this stage that corrective actions are being
taken. Quick police response time is essential at this stage (Traffic
Management, 1994:1‑3).
Serious thought and planning need to be given to the
types of operators who will be employed for the New Orleans system (e.g., will
they be police or civilian, and what will be the "real time" viewing
hours for the system). A review of the literature suggests that using full time
police officers to monitor and operate surveillance cameras has generally r=
been successful for a number of reasons. First, most American municipal
departments are operating at minimum officer capacities for existing patrols
and taking officers off the street to monitor cameras has depleted these
resources. Second, police officers report that operating and monitoring cameras
are boring, monotonous and do not constitute 'police work". If, however,
officers use
surveillance
systems to routinely "video patrol" their designated
"beats", either looking at potential trouble spots or following up on
reports of "suspicious activity", their participation logically follows
and is vital to the success of the system.
There
has, however, been success with well trained civilian personnel monitoring cameras.
These individuals for the most part come from the private security sector; and
many often have years of surveillance experience with commercial CCTV systems.
It is probably to the private security industry that we should look for proper
training of camera operators.
Project Management and Control
The overall management and
control of the public CCTV surveillance system are crucial to the entire
project. As generally conceived at this point in time, though not formally stated,
the chief objectives of the proposed New Orleans system appear ear to be: (1) reduction of criminal
activities and (2) reduction of public fear of crime in the CBD. These
objectives may suggest that placement of the management function of the system
should be in the hands of the New Orleans Police Department. This is not
necessarily the case and other options might be considered. Independent
contractors such as national private security or alarm service companies that
have experience with CCTV security systems offer a wide range of management
services. Management of the system to a large degree will be dependent on the
type of monitoring approach that the system will be premised on.
If management of the
public system is to be an exclusive law enforcement operation, however, several
key points need to be addressed:
(1) What
office or division of the NOPD will be in charge of the
management, coordination
and maintenance of the day to day operation
of the surveillance
program? Will there be a new management
position created for the
administration of the program? Will
the program be
administered by an existing division head or
will duties simply be
tacked on to a District Commander's responsibilities?
(2) Where will
the Central Monitoring Station be located ‑ in a storefront
in the CBD area
(possibly donated by a business) or in a district
or special duty station
(e.g., 8th District DDD Enhancement station)?
(3) Will commissioned police
officers monitor the cameras or will civilian trained personnel monitor the
cameras?
(4) Who will be in charge of training and supervision of
camera operators on a day to day basis?
(5) Who
will be in charge of the maintenance and repair of cameras
on a day to day basis,
especially if an out‑of‑state vendor installs the
system? Will any police
personnel be trained in maintenance and repair?
(6) Have projected
costs for maintenance and replacement of equipment
been established and who
will pick up these costs (for the pilot program
and for the full blown
system?)
(7) Will
existing communications systems of the NOPD be sufficient to
integrate with the central
monitoring station, or will additional equipment
be required, N so what?
(8) Will the NOPD
have sufficient numbers of officers to respond to video
"calls for
service". (Reports suggest that several districts are working
with minimal numbers of
officers.)
(9) Will "Data
Systems" of the NOPD in any way coordinate with the video
surveillance program in
analysis of data or will a unit like the now
defunct `Crime
Analysis" division be created or revived?
(10) Has NOPD top
management really offered a concrete plan on how they
will incorporate the
surveillance program into day to day operations?
It is recommended that a
separate study be conducted on the management and
control aspects of the proposed New
Orleans public CCTV system before further work
done on the project The study should explore
all possible project management
and control options of the
system law enforcement control and private control or
some combinations
thereof pointing out : (1,) management levels
(?) lines of
responsibility: (31
bottom line cost differentials‑ (4) performance monitoring and
evaluation: and (5)
staff selection training‑and and
(6) relationship of the
system to existing
services It is also recommended
that consideration‑be given to the
creation of a
"Video Surveillance Advisory
composed of business
people.
private citizens
police private security personnel. etc. which will serve in an advisory
capacity to management
Changing
Video Technology
A quote from Jim Aldrich, British Home Office
Police, merits attention:
Most established [public CCTV] systems have evolved
with mistakes being made and where they have been recognized, corrected if
resources have been available. The big bang solution is risky without advice
and planning. You may have a long time to regret buying an ineffective system
(Aldridge, 1994: 3).
Video technology and
equipment are rapidly changing. Many systems that were installed even a few
years ago have become outdated and are difficult to adapt to new systems and
are expensive to maintain. For example, digital video will at some point in
time replace analog video, which now requires digitized processing units for
input and output. An installation plan which is designed to accommodate future
upgrades and the adaptation of new technologies can result in major savings in
the long run.
Likewise, the integration of personal computers into
CCTV control systems is now standard practice. This allows for almost immediate
processing and storage of large amounts of data and signals while
simultaneously maintaining highly accurate records ‑an extremely
important feature of any public surveillance system. The integration of
personal computers needs to be included in the New Orleans system in order to
assure maximum use options. In view of the many technological options and rapid
changes, it is important for the underwriters of the New Orleans system to
establish and categorize their `design objectives" very clearly before any
bids go out (see Pierce, 1995) Careful attention should be given to the
selection of technical consultants for the project making sure they have
expertise in the full range of technical
options for the current time as well as the future.
Transmission Modes
Transmitting
the image from the camera to the monitoring station is dependent upon several
things: (1) the distance of the transmission; (2) the quality of images
desired; and (3) the budget of the project. Three transmission methods are in
use at the present time: fiber optic lines, "wireless systems ‑microwave,
laser and infrared, and hard wired systems. Fiber optic lines transmit the best
quality pictures, but are extremely expensive. Additionally, most first
generation fiber optic cables are not compatible with traditional video camera
systems. Installation of a fiber optic cable(s) is a delicate process which is
complicated and beyond the expertise of most installing engineers. Conversion
add on devices are currently required to make optics technology compatible with
traditional video equipment. Various wireless transmission methods such as
microwaves can save money at the installation stage since signals are sent
through the air, but image quality suffers over long distances because the
quality of the signal diminishes the farther it has to travel and signals are
also susceptible to urban interferences from other electronic devices. Hard
wired systems (coaxial cable) appear most compatible to urban public CCTV
systems of the type New Orleans is considering because of the cost, ease of
installation, compatibility with video cameras, monitors, and switchers and
general image quality (See Malstrom, 1994; Andrews, 1994; DeLia, 1994; Bowers,
n.d) Consideration should be given, however, to long term compatibility and expansion
of the hard wired system in the face of new transmission devices.
Cameras
The various applications
of cameras (and related accessories) for surveillance
are reasonably
straightforward and understood by CCTV engineers and installers. To
a large extent,
however, the intended uses of a public CCTV system dictates the types
Q cameras to be
installed Exclusive video recorded systems generally do not need
large numbers of scanning cameras which are
operator controlled. However, systems
that are operator controlled and that hope to
capture criminal events as they occur and
use the data to make cases against alleged
perpetrators need higher quality
resolution images. Knowledge gleaned from
other public surveillance systems
(especially in Europe) suggests that since the
uses of these systems change over time
(e.g., shifting from evidential collecting in
the making of criminal cases to general
public street surveillance or pedestrian and
motor vehicular traffic flow monitoring), it is
extremely important to design he system so
that never equipment (e g scanning
cameras. zoom lenses‑ imaae enhancing
equipment can be added and will be
compatible with installation parameters
Certain target areas of cities may not, for
example, require cameras with pan, tilt and
zoom lens capacity. Fixed cameras are
substantially cheaper to install and maintain
and do not require operator
manipulation.
Conclusion
Given the highly
technical society that we live in, it is inevitable that we will attempt to use
this technology to help solve problems that plague us. CCTV technology has
become a mainstay in the private security industry as a way to monitor
businesses and to provide safe environments for employees and customers. The
use of closed circuit televisions to monitor public safety in cities, therefore
logically follows. The newness of public surveillance systems and the lack of
evidence on their relative impact on crime and other social behavior make them
controversial and subject to review and
analysis.
These systems should
not be seen as "magic" solutions to a city's crime problem but rather
should be viewed as another potentially useful tool, which if employed
correctly, can aid in crime prevention and control. The underwriters of the
proposed public CCTV system in New Orleans should proceed cautiously and
examine in detail every aspect of the system before implementation begins.
Political or other pressures should not be the driving force behind this
endeavor.
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