Sociology and Negligent Security:
Lydia Voigt and William
E. Thornton. Jr.
Criminological research
methods and theories are growing in demand by policy and decision makers, as
well as by courts of law. Indeed, the call for criminologists as expert
witnesses is not confined to criminal court. Increasingly, criminologists are
invited as expert witnesses by the civil court, particularly in premise
security liability or third‑party liability suits.
Through the vehicle of civil
law, premise security liability is the civil liability of property owners to
provide reasonable and adequate security to customers and other invited patrons
onto their premises. When a property owner fails to provide a reasonably safe
environment to patrons and, as a result, an invited individual suffers a
criminal victimization such as a rape, armed robbery, or assault by a third
party, the property owner may be liable under civil jurisdiction for losses the
patron incurs. Relatives of patrons who are murdered on premises are, likewise,
subject to civil remedy associated with the loss of a loved one. Losses may
include costs associated with physical injury, psychological trauma leading to
inability to enjoy life or earn a living, and future income foregone as a
result of victimization.
To a large extent, the
standards necessary to trigger the charge of negligent security on the part of
public and private establishments are subject to legal debate and vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The controversy usually focuses on several key
questions that generally must be answered when inadequate security is alleged
against a property owner or manager in a civil action. Does the owner or
occupier of the property owe a legal duty of care to the plaintiff? Was the
interpersonal crime foreseeable on the premises? Did the owner or occupier of
the property fail to conform to a "reasonable standard of care"? Was
the negligence the proximate cause of the assaultive crime upon the plaintiff?
Was the plaintiff damaged or otherwise injured as a result of that breach of
duty? (McGoey 1990:19).
Experts often are called
upon to help clarify the issues and to provide defensible guidelines for making
decisions or judgments pertaining to questions of "foreseeable
crime," 'seasonable standard of care," and "adequate
security." Attorneys employ a wide variety of experts to both collect data
for their cases and render advice and opinions regarding the grounds for the
case. Given that no uniform standard of criminal foreseeability to guide courts
exists, the "definition of the situation" proffered by criminologist
ezparla at each stage in a premise liability case ‑ beginning from
initial conception and moving to deposition to settlement or trial ‑ has
a tremendous influence on whether a case is lost, settled, or won. Perhaps in
no other area of law is it possible for criminologists to define and set the
parameters of legal decisions as well as to establish precedence as in the
realm of premise liability.
This chapter illustrates,
through case examples, how our training in criminology and sociology has been
instrumental in influencing the overall development of cases as well as
outcomes of specific cases. Much of what we bring to our clients, chiefly
attorneys, in terms of methodological and analytical skills comes from our
training as academic sociologists and criminologists.1 As premise liability
consultants and expert witnesses, we have participated in more than 100 cases,
both plaintiff and defense, and have been declared criminological experts by
numerous courts in several states. Our consulting practice has brought us in
competition with many experts coming from varied backgrounds. Rarely have these
other experts brought to clients the panorama of analytical, methodological,
and theoretical skills necessary to fully conceptualize, investigate, and
develop a case. Indeed, we argue that the very "stuff' of criminology as a
discipline strongly lends itself to this particular area of litigation.
This chapter introduces our
"crime foreseeability model," which we developed utilizing many years
of experience in premise liability litigation. The model demonstrates the
practical applicability of research methods, theories, and the use of
sociological and criminological imagination. Our discussion begins with a
review of the history of third‑party criminal liability suits and current
developments in civil procedure as they relate to premise security litigation.
Until recently, most victims
of interpersonal violent crimes did not realize that there was another legal
avenue available to them for both increased crime protection and financial
remedy for their losses. The first major award for an inadequate security claim
involved a $2.7 million dollar judgment for entertainer Connie Francis, who was
raped in a Howard Johnson Motor Lodge in upstate New York in 1974. Her
assailant gained entry through a faulty sliding glass door. Francis alleged
inadequate security and presented evidence of past similar offenses being
committed against motel guests during the few years prior to her victimization
(Gannilli u. )Toward Johnson's Motor
Lodge, Inc. 1976).
Over the years, there has
been a growing trend to expand liability from third‑party criminal
actions to include such diverse businesses or entities as hotels and motels,
shopping centers, parking lots, apartment complexes, hospitals, fast‑food
establishments, bars, casinos, convenience stores, restaurants, airports, train
and bus depots, and educational institutions. More recently, municipalities
that operate such facilities as public parks, amusement parks, and museums have
been held to higher standards of security than in the past and, hence, are
subject to civil liability for inadequate security. Even public schools are not
immune to civil liability suits from parents who have children hurt by the
criminal actions of third parties who intrude on school premises. There is no
doubt that the threat of inadequate security suits has motivated owners,
managers, and administrators of public and private establishments to be more
cognizant of potential criminal dangers to patrons and to respond by making
their facilities safer (Wright 1994; Holl and Newton 1992).
In the past decade, premise
liability tort filings have increased more than 260 percent, with the average
settlement being in excess of $545,000 and the average jury award being $3.35
million (Bates and Dunnell 1993). A study of 267 premise security cases
reported in The Law Reporter, published
by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, found that the crimes that
cause the vast majority of premise liability suits are found in four main
categories: rape and sexual assault (44.5 percent), assault and battery (24.9
percent), wrongful death (18.5 percent), and robbery (8.7 percent). The types
of businesses most often involved in inadequate security torts are residential
properties (37.6 percent), hotels and motels (24.2 percent), and retail
establishments (8.4 percent). Others include restaurants, bars, and casinos
(6.7 per‑ office buildings (5.1 percent); colleges (3.9 percent); and
common carriers (e.g., buses, trains, airplanes) (11.3 percent). Apartment
units, parking lots, and garages account for more than 40 percent of the
specific locations where crimes are committed against invited patrons (Bates
and Dunnell 1993).
One reason that rapes result
in the highest percentage of premise liability claims is the nature of the
violence perpetrated against the victim. In addition to the physical harm that
usually ensues with a rape, deep emotional trauma often is associated with the
attack. More recently, the fear of contracting AIDS further exacerbates the
fear of the victim long after the initial rape. Wrongful deaths in which the
victim dies as a result of the negligence of a third party usually result in
the highest awards, based upon considerations of lost future earnings and loss
of consortium claims by spouses (Bates and Dunnell 1993).
Three competing schools of thought
regarding the criteria necessary to establish crime foreseeability can be found
in tort law decisions, chiefly at the state level, regarding premise liability.
The first is the impending assault doctrine. Some courts have maintained that a
business owner has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect patrons only
from the criminal acts of third parties that he or she knows are about to occur
(i.e., the impending assault). If a business owner had knowledge of a crime to
be perpetrated against a customer, he or she would be under a legal obligation
to either warn or attempt to prevent the impending assault. As a minimum
caution, the owner is under obligation to at least warn patrons of potential
dangers. Courts have generally maintained, however, that rarely are business
owners in the position to actually know that a customer or patron was the
target of an impending attack. For example, criminal victimization of
acquaintances or relatives that spill over into the commercial areas generally
are considered unforeseen unless the manager or proprietor has been put on
prior notice.
CASE ILLUSTRATION:
IMPENDING ASSAULT
A case that occurred a few years ago involved a woman who was assaulted in a strip shopping center parking lot by a man. Upon investigation, we found that the perpetrator was an exemployee of the company where the woman worked. He recently had been fired by the victim, who was a personnel manager of the company. The man had been stalking her for several days prior to the attack. The court held that the attack upon the woman in the parking lot could not have been foreseen by the shopping center management. The center's management had no prior knowledge of the conflict between the two individuals and, therefore, could not have warned the woman of the impending attack.
Other courts accept the
notion that a crime is unforeseeable unless the owner or manager knows that
there have been a "high" number of similar offenses that occurred on
the premises (the prior similar crimes rule). Thus, if a plaintiff is a victim
of rape in a business' restroom, and it can be proven that other women have
been raped in the restroom in the past, the crime in question could be argued
as foreseeable on the part of the business owner. Conversely, pending no prior
similar crimes at a site in question, it may be argued by some that the crime
was unforeseeable. Recent decisions have called into question exclusive use of
the prior similar crimes rule on the grounds that the victims of crime are
victimized twice if they are attacked in a facility for the first time.
Initially they suffer from the criminal attack, and then they are unable to
recover in lawsuits because they were the first victim. The prior similar
crimes rule has been likened to the legal maxim, "Every dog is entitled to
one free bite." Issues raised against the exclusive use of the prior
similar crimes rule have resulted in widening the variables under
consideration. In essence, knowledge of a canine's dangerous propensities can
be established before the first bite.
More recently, courts have
examined a greater variety of circumstances in crime foreseeability (the
totality of circumstances rule), arguing that, in addition to prior similar
crimes, the general circumstances surrounding a criminal incident must also
come into play (e.g., other patterns of criminality at a site and crime in
adjoining areas, frequency of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, demographic
conditions, and security measures such as ingress and egress devices,
monitoring technology, architectural design, and guardS.3 The totality of
circumstances rule seems to offer a better reasoned basis for determining crime
foreseeability because it suggests a multivariate analysis of crime ‑
something sociologists and criminologists have been doing for a long time. Much
of the discipline of criminology, including crime measurement, crime etiology,
crime prevention, and crime control, supports the components of the totality of
circumstances rule.
THE CRIME FORESEEABILITY MODEL
Although not every case demands
an in‑depth investigation of all variables, most cases will require
several stages of development. The crime foreseeability model that we propose
is based on a checklist of data and information necessary for a systematic and
comprehensive case development. It includes standard methods of criminology for
collecting data and a rich body of theories to render an opinion on crime
foreseeability and security adequacy for a client (plaintiff or defendant). The
model introduced here ensures the orderly (i.e., scientifically sound)
collection of data and theoretically adequate analysis of data. Our
comprehensive and systematic approach to the discovery of information and to
the defensibility of evidence is composed of the following areas of
investigation:
Analysis
of prior similar and other interpersonal crimes
Analysis
of incident reports and supplemental crime data
Analysis
of other types of crimes at the site
Analysis
of the level of security at the site
Physical security factors
Security plan and philosophy
Review
of any relevant security standards
Analysis
of social, economic, and demographic characteristics
Nature
and profile of the offender
Nature
and profile of the victim
ANALYSIS OF PRIOR SIMILAR AND
OTHER INTERPERSONAL CRIMES
Irrespective of the legal
debate (e.g., Siebert v. Vic Regnier
Builders, Inc. [1993]) regarding the problems associated with the exclusive
use of prior similar crimes rule, our model necessitates the acquisition of
this information. It is important to conduct a complete crime analysis of sametype
crimes utilizing police statistics (e.g., offenses reported to local police)
for the specific geographical locale (e.g., police district, zone, or subzone)
where a case is located.4 This information is not used exclusively but represents
only the first step in a more comprehensive approach.
For example, if a case that
is being investigated involves the rape of a woman in the parking lot of a
shopping center, we begin with an examination of the occurrence of other rapes
at the site and in the surrounding area. An arbitrarily designated geographical
area with specific boundaries can be used for this purpose. However, police
district and zone maps are considered standard for the display of this
information, especially because official crime data are collected in relation
to such districts. Specific crime rates then can be generated for the area in
question as well as for an entire city.
In addition, crime analysis
almost always should include a rate analysis of the major Uniform Crime Reporting
(UCR) index offenses (i.e., murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson). It is impossible to
speak of "low" or "high" crime areas without some means of
comparison (Thornton, McKinnon‑Fowler, and Kent 1991).
Through a general crime
statistical analysis, it may be possible to show that the rate of violent crime
at a site is substantially higher (or lower) than that for surrounding areas
or, possibly, for an entire city. Thus, whether or not prior rapes had occurred
on the premise, the relative dangerousness of the site and the relative
adequacy of security can be established. Based on our experience as premise
liability consultants, we have found that armed robbery is one of the best
indicators of an area's or city's general level of "dangerousness."
Armed robbery, unlike other crimes of violence, usually involves strangers
rather than acquaintances or relatives.
Utilizing official
statistics, we rank armed robberies by police districts and zones and subzones
for several years, statistically weigh these, and create an index that can be
used for comparative purposes. This index can be further decomposed by
controlling for population size, types and numbers of commercial establishments
versus residential facilities, and so on. For instance, the robbery rates per
100,000 population at a shopping center and in the surrounding area (e.g.,
number of customers per day or number of cars in the mall parking area divided
by the number of incidents of robbery) could be computed. If, for example, the
robbery rate is lower at a shopping center where a rape
occurred than in the
surrounding area, it would be difficult to argue
inadequate security.
Computing per capita crime rates for both the
specific crime in question
as well as other index crimes,especially
armed robbery, for
"defendant" premises and for the surrounding com-
munity cannot be overvalued.
This places a particular victimization in
a broader crime and security
context.
An example of a defendant
case in which we served as consultants illustrates the need for a thorough
analysis of prior similar crimes in conjunction with a more general crime
analysis. We were retained by an attorney representing a Mexican fast‑food
restaurant that recently had gone out of business. The plaintiffs in the case
were the parents of a young man who had been murdered in a parking lot adjacent
to the restaurant. The young man and his girlfriend parked in the lot (about 50
feet away), walked to the restaurant to eat, and, upon returning to their car,
were victimized. Although the owners of the business did not own the adjacent
parking lot, over the years, customers often parked in the lot because of its
convenience to the restaurant. Management had made no effort to discourage
parking in the lot, which was locate next to an abandoned mechanic's shop. Upon
investigation, our analysis of prior similar crimes at the restaurant revealed
two other murders in the parking lot adjacent to the business. We also
uncovered several armed and simple robberies of patrons and cashiers working in
the restaurant. The management of the business had no security measures in
place, in spite of the relatively large number of past interpersonal criminal
offenses. Many of the crimes had occurred at night, and the lighting in the
parking lot was inadequate. The general area surrounding the business likewise
was ranked high in both the volume and the rate of violent offenses in
comparison with other police districts in the city.
Our opinion to the attorney
was that, given past crime events on the site, the general dangerousness of the
surrounding area, and the absence of even minimal security measures, the
deceased victim's parents had a very strong case against the Mexican
restaurant. The owners of the business had not, in our opinion, responded in a
responsible manner to protect customers, given the past crime trends on and off
the site. There was a high probability that a crime such as the one that
occurred could have been foreseen. Our advice to the attorney was to settle the
case early. The case was, indeed, settled for the defendant. We later found out
that the owners had decided to close this particular restaurant because they
were having difficulty hiring employees, who were frightened by the past
reputation of the business as being a dangerous place to work.
ANALYSIS OF INCIDENT
REPORTS AND
SUPPLEMENTAL CRIME DATA
As part of the crime
analysis for specific crimes on and off a site, more detailed information can
be obtained by acquiring the official incident reports available from law
enforcement agencies. If the case is closed and does not involve juvenile
offenders or victims, such reports are public record and can be obtained easily
for a fee; some police departments allow researchers to view such reports on
microfiche at no charge. If the case is still active, a subpoena duces tecum
must be obtained in order to access this data. Included in these reports are
detailed information regarding the victim and the offender and the
circumstances surrounding the crime event. In addition to these reports, more
information may be gleaned about the crime and the crime scene from depositions
and other materials that invariably accompany a civil action for third‑party
criminal liability and may be requested from the attorneys representing the
case.
Often, the experts must
conduct interviews and develop other supplemental information using standard
social science methodologies. For instance, if an official incident report
appears incomplete or somehow confusing, the expert may attempt to check out
certain details or facts by going on location and interviewing individuals in
residences or businesses where the incident took place. The expert also may
conduct interviews to confirm or refute certain perceptions of dangerousness
("fear of crime") or opinions regarding the adequacy of security on
the premise. If this information is intended to be used as evidence in court,
all the rigors of the scientific method come into play. Increasingly, courts
place emphasis on "scientifically derived information," that is,
challenging expert testimony on scientific grounds.
CASE ILLUSTRATION:
A CITY PARK'S SAFETY AND
SECURITY
In a past case, we served on
the plaintiff's side against a city park commission for not providing
reasonable security for a man who was shot and robbed in a park restroom. Part
of our task was to establish that enough past crimes had occurred in the park
(40 acres) (and periphery of the park) to merit increased security for the
protection of park patrons. Park security (which, in this case, amounted to two
untrained groundskeepers) claimed that they maintained very few records of
crimes that occurred in the park. The security director, an accountant,
suspiciously testified that films regarding past criminal activity in the park
could not be found, although he was sure there was little criminal activity in
the park. We, therefore, requested from the crime analysis section of the
police department a printout of all offenses that occurred in the park and the
police zone and subzone in which the park was located for a period of five
years prior to the incident.
Based on interviews with
residents living on the periphery of the park and on interviews with a
systematic sample of park patrons, common knowledge
indicated that many crimes
occurred in the park. We consequently expected that our official police
statistics would confirm the relatively high crime rate for the park (and
adjoining areas). We were surprised to find only a few officially documented
crimes from the reports (a computer printout with a police item number,
address, date, time, and type of crime occurring). For instance, the crime
statistics for the area uncovered eight serious interpersonal crimes in the park
during the same year of the crime in question. Something was wrong. Subsequent
investigation (including a door‑to‑door survey of the residents in
the adjacent area and an analysis of the more detailed police incident reports)
revealed that, when a park crime was reported, the victim or bystander usually
proceeded to the nearest phone (e.g., pay phone booths across the street from
the park) or to a home on the boundary of the park. Consequently, the address
where the call was placed rather than the location of the criminal act (i.e.,
the park) ‑ was registered on the official police report. As a result,
the crime appears to have taken place outside
the park. In fact, this was the case with the crime in question. This
practice, we found, was quite common and reflected a definite flaw is the
police reporting system.
Only by requesting a more
detailed incident (and supplemental) report (i.e., the officer's field
interrogation report and subsequent follow‑up) could we pinpoint specific
crimes that occurred within the boundaries of the park. Consideration of
incident reports, however, still failed to account for the discrepancies
between official reports and the common perceptions of this area as having a
high crime rate.
In an effort to augment the
official statistics, we did a content analysis (for the same years) of the
local newspaper and discovered a few additional crimes reported to have
occurred in the park that did not show up in the official statistics. We
concentrated on those crimes that we could definitely document (i.e., those
that occurred within the boundaries of the park), and then we examined more
closely those "official" crimes that occurred on the boundaries of
the park and adjacent neighborhoods. A comparison of crime patterns occurring
in this particular police district (or, more precisely, the geographical
subzone of the district) with those occurring in other districts of the city
did suggest that this section of the city experienced a relatively higher
number of victimizations. Especially in relation to its size, population, and
square miles, the park was the site of a disproportionately high number of
crimes. We also uncovered a survey conducted by the city a few years earlier
that drew a similar conclusion. The survey included a fear of crime inventory
in which the citizens in the area indicated that they were seriously concerned
about crime and their protection.
Our opinion to our client,
and the subsequent opinion in court, was that, given the overall crime patterns
and lack of security in the park, it was logical to infer that this type of
crime was reasonably foreseeable. Furthermore, we also offered an analysis of
the location and architectural design of the restrooms in the park that was
based on an area of criminology known as "crime control through
environmental design" (Harries 1974; Jeffrey 1977; Kaplan, O'Kane,
Lavrakas, and Peace 1978; Rubenstein, Murray, Motoyama, and Rouse 1980; Crowe
1991). The judgment for the case ruled in favor of our client, and he was
awarded in excess of $2 million. The judgment, however,
later was overturned at the
appeals level, reverting back to the exclusive prior similar crimes rule.
ANALYSIS OF OTHER TYPES OF CRIMES AT A SITE
In addition to the
examination of prior similar and other interpersonal crimes at a site (and in
the surrounding area), a crime analysis also must examine other types of
crimes, such as property offenses, that may have occurred on a premise.
Although property crimes such as auto burglaries or auto thefts usually are not
good predictors of crimes against the person at a site, the prevalence of large
numbers of auto burglaries, even in the absence of prior similar violent
crimes, may be used to suggest that opportunities for more serious crimes
against customers or other invited guests may occur. Certain types of property
crimes, such as shoplifting in a store, may have no relationship to either
other property crimes or interpersonal crimes occurring in a parking lot
against patrons. In general, even a large number of minor property crimes are
not substantially similar enough to predict future stranger violence in many
situations. At least some empirical research has suggested that property crime
statistics are not valid indicators of future crimes of violence. For instance,
an analysis of UCR data indicated that one aggravated assault can be expected
in 1,000 motor vehicle thefts and that one murder can ensue from 45,000 motor
vehicle thefts (Security Law Newsletter 1990).
Courts usually do not accept the expert opinion that minor property crimes at a
site are good predictors of violent crimes.
It is worth noting that
comparing crime trends, even property crimes, from one site, such as a shopping
mall parking lot, with those at another comparable site in the same vicinity
can be used to point to possible security problems. If one shopping center
parking lot, for example, has roving security guards and, as a result, has a
minimal amount of auto burglaries or auto thefts, and another shopping center
in the same vicinity has no guards but a large number of property crimes, an
argument can be made for the relative inadequacies of security at the latter
site. Thus, although the numbers of minor property crimes may not be valid
indicators of future crimes of violence, they can indicate the relative
adequacy of security and, thus, be useful from that perspective.
THE LEVEL OF SECURITY AT A
8M
Levels of security at a site
can range from minor precautions (e.g., written warnings, signs, fencing) to
major precautions (e.g., contract or proprietary security personnel, elaborate
security lighting, full perimeter security fencing, electronic monitoring
systems, intrusion detection devices). The nature of the third‑party
criminal event and the past crime trends, if any, on the premises and in the surrounding
area generally dictate the level of security necessary at a particular site.
Standard investigation of a
case usually requires a security evaluation or assessment, in which a number of
key factors must be examined. Such an assessment includes an intensive physical
examination of the premises in order to determine the current state of
security, to locate or assess weaknesses, and to make recommendations for
"hardening" the facility in order to prevent future criminal
intrusions. Obviously, in a defense case, the investigator tries to emphasize
existing security measures and points to their general adequacy. In a plaintiff
case, weaknesses in security at a facility become the focal point, and
recommendations of security improvement measures that may have prevented a
third‑party criminal offense are stressed.
Although each site or
facility is unique in terms of the actual risks it is designed to control and
its subsequent vulnerabilities, two general areas of crime prevention
methodology may be addressed in premise liability cases as being necessary for
a reasonable standard of care to protect customers and other invited guests;
environmental design and physical security factors and security plan or
security philosophy.
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN AND
PHYSICAL SECURITY FACTORS
A number of physical
environmental variables have long been associated with crime deterrence or
crime displacement. Under Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design the
architectural design, placement of buildings, parking lots, and movement
generators (e.g., walkways, overpasses, corridors, and halls) at a site can
affect the opportunities for criminal events to occur. Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design chiefly attempts to achieve crime prevention by modifying
the physical features of the target setting. For example, it offers methods for
designing or redesigning commercial and residential buildings, other commercial
areas, parks, or even entire neighborhoods in order to reduce crime. These
methods may be as sophisticated as Oscar Newman's (1973) design directive for
public housing developments or as simple as locating an automatic teller
machine so that it lends itself to natural observation.
Another body of theoretical
works that provides a rich supply of theory and research evidence that experts
may use to "support" conclusions regarding environmental and social
conditions associated with high and low crime trends is routine activities
theory (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson 1987). The routine activity approach to
crime rate analysis suggests that, by guiding the natural flow of individuals
and activities so that offenders and targets rarely meet in the absence of
natural, informal controls (e.g., public observation), crime temptation and
victimization may be reduced.
SECURITY PLAN AND SECURITY PHILOSOPHY
Many premise liability cases hinge on the presence or absence of a master
security plan at the establishment. Such a plan should address such things as
the establishment's or management's philosophy toward security, allocation of
resources for security, the name or type of security employment (is there a
security director with a clear line of authority and accountability?), the name
of the security plan, training of security personnel (is the training of
security guards adhering to state licensing requirements or industry?), clear
direction for security personnel, maintenance of records of problems and
criminal events (e.g., incident reports), integration of security hardware into
a secure plan, integration of local law enforcement into the master plan,
coordination of security codes, and periodic review of the security program.
A security plan, of course,
must be carried out on a daily basis if it is to be of any use to a particular
establishment. Failure to implement security procedures, even if they exist on
paper, can be just as bad from a liability stance in some states as having no
security plan at all. Usually, the first step in judging the adequacy of a
security plan is to do a security assessment of a site, including an analysis
of the types of criminal events that occur at a site and in the surrounding
area. We have used the illustration below in several different cases that
required comparative data regarding levels of security in relation to crime
patterns and citizens' perceptions of fear of crime.
CASE ILLUSTRATION:
SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS
Surveys sponsored by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development as well as several national
conferences on public housing show that the quality of life of public housing
residents is reduced more by crime and fear of crime than by any other social
problem. Crime analysis studies conducted by Brill and associates (1972, 1973,
1974, 1975, 1978) show that crime rates in various public housing complexes are
five to ten times higher than the national average. More recent studies, many
undertaken by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, place the rate
at a much higher level (Robinson 1985). Studies of residents who live in public
housing uniformly report that 60 to 70 percent of respondents indicate that it
is very dangerous to go out of their apartments at night. Several studies
undertaken of New Orleans public housing residents over the years indicate
similar findings (e.g., Criminal Victimization Surveys in New Orleans 1977;
Neighborhood Profile Series in New Orleans 1980; Thornton and Voigt 1986). Victimization
in public halls, elevators, and other common areas particularly are cited
as being dangerous. Parents especially fear for the safety of their children
and have no assurances that they can play safely on the grounds of the
developments, even during daylight hours. Thornton and Voigt (1984‑86)
found that the children in public housing developments often have a view of the
world much different than that of middle‑class children living in private
residential areas. Children who live in public housing, as early as three or
four years old, see the world as a dangerous place, one in which survival is
highly questionable and dependent on street skills rather than school sldlls.
Given this backdrop, we were
retained by a large public housing authority to examine specifically those
types of crimes committed in ten public housing developments with a combined
tenant population of about 100,000; conduct a residential survey of crime and
ways to combat crime in the developments; review existing security measures,
including an environmental assessment of each complex; and provide the data
necessary to develop a comprehensive security plan for the public housing
developments (Thornton and McKinnon 1992).
Our crime analysis utilized
official data spanning a 5‑year period for each housing complex. Major
UCR index crime categories were employed, with special attention given to drug‑related
homicides and other interpersonal crimes of violence, such as rape and armed
robbery, that occurred in the public housing boundaries. A separate analysis of
crimes in surrounding neighborhoods of the developments was also completed. A
property and violent crime index was calculated for each site for every year
that data were collected.
Our tenant survey revealed
that structural and physical security appeared to be the overwhelming concern
of tenants. Everyone felt that limited access to the developments would be a
key factor in eliminating the outside influences that terrorized the residents
and their children. Some of the suggestions made by residents included cutting
off streets to limit access, constructing attractive, contemporary fencing in
and around the development, enhancing lighting, and redesigning the
configuration of the buildings. Along with modifications to the area
surrounding the perimeter of the development, residents suggested a need to
modify the buildings themselves. Residents stated many times that a large
proportion of the illegal activities occurring in the developments are
conducted in the hallways of buildings. There was general agreement that these
hallways should be eliminated and replaced by exterior stairs.
Our audit of existing
security and vulnerabilities was aided greatly by tenant input and included a
site‑by‑site checklist and dueled analysis of such things as
location of buildings in relation to one another; ingress and egress patterns
of buildings, sites, and parking lots; existing lighting; existing police
patrols; maintenance records of buildings and grounds; location of public
transit stops; pedestrian and traffic flows onto sites; surrounding
neighborhood crime magnets; and existing housing authority security in place
patrols, past incident reports, personnel, and so on.
Our recommendations for a
comprehensive security plan for the developments included several categories:
physical environmental recommendations, social environmental recommendations,
drug control and prevention recommendations, law enforcement and security
recommendations; and housing authority management recommendations. .
Under physical environmental
factors, recommendations were made regarding type and placement of outdoor
lighting, ways of controlling penetrability of sites, ways of enhancing
territoriality of tenants by installing barriers, defining and enhancing
private space boundaries for housing units, and clustering multifamily
dwellings with well‑defined common areas such as courtyards and
playgrounds. We also recommended reducing tenant density by moving or tearing
down abandoned buildings, which served as havens for drug users.
Under social environmental
factors, the recommendations involved the enhancement of tenant cohesiveness
and leadership in relation to apartment management; the development of more
community service activities, especially for juveniles (e.g., expansion of
afterschool and weeknight activities for the children); and domestic crisis and
family support centers.5
Under drug control and prevention,
the recommendations concerned greater law enforcement efforts to target
"upper level" drug dealers in and near public housing. Likewise, we
recommended that drug prevention programs be established or enhanced for public
housing residents.
Under law enforcement and
security, the recommendations focused on a plan to coordinate the housing
authority and the metropolitan police in an effort to establish cooperative
approaches to crime prevention and crime control. More specifically, the
recommendation addressed the need for dedicated law enforcement to be assigned
to specific housing developments rather than utilizing periodic patrols that
just drive through the developments occasionally. It also was recommended that
existing housing authority security be enlarged with better trained and better
deployed personnel according to a comprehensive security plan.
Security plans and
assessments such as this one are not uncommon. People residing in housing
developments not only are more aware of their crime problems but also are more
likely today to demand that their rights to live in safe environments be
regarded by public authorities. Residents of public housing developments who
are victimized by crime are increasingly bringing successful liability suits against
municipal authorities. This trend is consistent with the greater likelihood
that many businesses and public entities will develop comprehensive crime
control and prevention plans and programs as part of their routine operations
and management (e.g., universities, schools, hospitals). The growing need for
professional crime and security evaluations offers significant opportunities
for practicing criminologists.
REVIEW OF INDUSTRY STANDARDS OF SECURITY
Over the past few years,
business‑specific regulations have been proffered by various professional
organizations (e.g., National Association of Chain Restaurants, National
Association of Convenience Stores, International Council of Shopping Centers,
Property Management Association, American Bankers Association, International
Association for Healthcare Security and Safety). In addition to regulations
regarding the operation of a particular business or franchise, minimum security
standards are often set in place as a model to guide business owners.
For example, crime
prevention studies of ways to reduce convenience store robberies suggest that
designing stores to enhance visibility from the street, eliminating concealed
access, closing stores between midnight and 6 A.M., and utilizing more than one
sales clerk can be successful in reducing robberies (Weapons Against Crime 1994; Hunter and Jeffery 1992). In addition, the National
Association of Convenience Stores provides training for store owners and
managers in robbery deterrence through various seminars and other publications
(National Association of Convenience Stores 1987). Convenience store owners who
have a crime perpetrated against a customer or salesperson and who have not
familiarized themselves with crime prevention strategies used in their particular
industry run the risk of being held to a higher level of accountability than
store owners who avail themselves of all
possible knowledge and ways
to reduce the probability of a crime occurring at their place of business. It
is the responsibility of the crime expert to be knowledgeable of the standards
in the industry.
The development of standards
providing minimal guidelines for security is relatively new. Therefore,
assessments of the effectiveness of these standards are greatly needed and
frequently become the focal point of civil lawsuits. These recent developments offer criminologists working on such
impact or outcome assessments groundbreaking opportunities to study the
corresponding effects of security policies and plans and to contribute to the
development of security stands in the future.
Public schools, for example,
are not immune from civil liability and litigation as the result of crime and
violence. The problem of school crime and violence is serious. At least 40
percent of the robberies and assaults on teenagers occur in schools (Rapp,
Carrington, and Nicholson 1992:2‑3).
Victims of school violence have responded to school crime by demanding that
schools provide an orderly and safe environment or compensate victims for their
injuries. School systems largely remain under local control with respect to the
operation of schools on a day‑to‑day basis. Some minimum standards
for securing the safety of students and faculty have evolved over the years,
with many coming from research and guidelines set by the National School Safety
Center located at Pepperdine University (School
Safety Check Book 1990).
Various approaches to
security measures have been attempted in order to curb public school crime and
violence. Most schools use relatively unobtrusive measures to control the
problem; however, stricter, more traditional security measures also are used to
control school violence. The less intrusive security measures include limited
ingress point into a facility; the use of visible student, faculty, and visitor
identification cards; monitoring of ingress and egress points into a facility;
the use of signs informing visitors to check in at the main office; supervision
of student restrooms, especially in primary and elementary
schools; putting greater
distance between the school and public transportation (e.g., moving bus stops
farther away from school grounds); the implementation of a security plan at the
school involving all personnel and students in creating a safe environment; the
involvement of parents in the school security and safety plan; the
establishment of a neighborhood school watch program, involving residents in
neighborhoods near the school; a well‑organized and carefully monitored
department of safety and security for the municipal school district and office;
the creation of conflict resolution programs in the school; and the
establishment of an incident and tracking system in the school to identify
problems and potentially dangerous students (or staff and faculty).
In some cases, more
intrusive security measures have been implemented (especially in high crime
schools located in high crime areas). Such measures include surveillance
cameras placed in "hot spots" (e.g., halls, cafeterias, playgrounds,
open spaces surrounding the school);
metal detectors at ingress
points in the school; school security personnel making regular rounds in the
school; and periodic searches of student lockers for "reasonable
cause" cases, and so on.
The development of standards
providing minimal guidelines for security is relatively new. Therefore,
assessments of the effectiveness of these standards frequently become the focal
point of civil lawsuits. These developments offer criminologists working on
such impact or outcome assessments groundbreaking opportunities to study the
corresponding effects of security policies and plans and to contribute to the
development of security standards in the future.
Schools were never intended
to be minijails, nor were they designed to be urban or suburban
"fortresses" walled off from their communities. We have found that
the more traditional security measures, when applied to an educational setting,
often alter the very atmosphere of the school, creating an environment not
conducive to learning. In cases involving security at public schools, we
usually help defense attorneys develop arguments and justifications for less
intrusive, more informal, and more community oriented security measures.
CASE ILLUSTRATION:
SECURITY ASSESSMENT
OF A PUBLIC ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
As consultants retained by a
law firm representing a metropolitan school board, we were asked to assess
security at an elementary school where an alleged incident of sexual battery
occurred between two learning disabled adolescents; one was a student at the
school, the other had been a student at the school. The police did not file
formal charges because of the lack of evidence in the case; there was a
reasonable suspicion that the alleged sexual act was one of mutual consent. The
mother of the 14 year old, however, filed a premise liability suit against the
school, alleging that the school created a dangerous environment for her son.
The neighborhood school was
relatively small, with fewer than 500 students, and had a reputation for its
caring and concerned faculty and administrators. It was located in what might
be described as a lower income, working‑class community with a moderate
degree of criminal activity as evidenced by an examination of property and
violent crime trends over a 5year period prior to the incident in question.
According to our security
assessment, the school met the minimum standards provided by the National
School Safety Center. It was a wellmaintained facility with a ten‑foot
chain‑link fence enclosing the full perimeter of the site. However, we
found that there were several unmonitored ingress points to the school. The
restroom where the incident occurred was near an open and unmonitored gate on a
side street adjacent to the school.
Our review of internal
incident reports maintained by the school revealed no prior sexual incidents
between students, and aside from a few behavioral problems with some students,
no serious offenses had ever been reported at the school. Official police
reports for the area revealed the same. Aside from two burglaries that occurred
after school hours, no official crimes had been reported.
Our opinion in the matter
was that, given the lack of prior incidents at the school, given the high level
of supervision that was evidenced by teachers and staff, and given the lack of
evidence of an actual sexual assault having occurred, the offense in question
was not reasonably foreseeable by the school. However, our security assessment
of the school indicated that several changes were warranted in order to better
control strangers' access to school grounds. Although there were numerous signs
around the campus indicating that visitors must check in with the main office,
several ingress points into the school made it difficult to prevent nonschool
personnel from entering the school. We recommended, in particular, that the
open gate near the restroom in question either be locked (which would not
violate fire codes) or be monitored. Likewise, we recommended that the number
of access points in the school be reduced to only those that could be monitored
or watched by school personnel. We also recommended that a formal plan be
instituted by the school to ensure regular checks on restrooms during the
school day; no such plan had been formally in place. As part of a larger range
plan, we recommended developing greater community ties and giving more
attention to community‑oriented security approaches. The case never went
to trial; it was settled out of court. Our recommendations, however, were
accepted and have been implemented.
ANALYSIS Oh SOCIAL. ECONOMIC. AND
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
A thorough analysis of the
social, economic, and demographic characteristics of an area are of utmost
importance in any crime foreseeability study.6 Through hundreds of crime
prevention studies, criminologists have found correlations between certain
types of demographic data and street‑type crimes. Census data are very
useful for this type of analysis (Voigt, Thornton, Barille, and Seaman 1994).
Census maps allow the
researcher to analyze even neighborhood block level data. It is possible to
obtain detailed information about a particular area, including average
household income, percent of rentals versus home ownership, number of abandoned
or substandard houses, number and type of multidwelling units (e.g., apartment
complexes), government subsidized houses, ethnic dispersions, and the like.
Other data sources that supply regional data can be found is most locales
(e.g., neighborhood profile studies, chamber of commerce, and marketing
studies). Geomapping software (utilizing digital geographical files and various
attribute data) to plot crime data on census maps in relation to specific
social demographic variables is also available. Such software allows
researchers to engage in innovative types of crime analysis. For example,
"hot spots" can be targeted in terms of specific types of
interpersonal and property
crimes by geographical areas as small as city blocks. It also is possible to
plot, depending on available data, offending patterns to determine the
"routine activities" of offenders (Felson 1987; McIver 1981; Cohen,
Felson, and Land 1980). These data are invaluable in trying to determine the
"career patterns" of certain types of offenders within specific
geographical locales. This new computer technology is revolutionizing the uses
of census and crime data,
not only by criminologists
but also by urban planners, developers, law enforcement personnel, and courts.
Although each crime site
must be analyzed on its own merits, criminologists for a long time have found
that several demographic factors are empirically correlated with crime trends.
Generally, the interdispersement of residential properties with commercial
properties is associated with greater criminal opportunities, leading to the
victimization of people and property. For example, residential complexes
located on direct routes to bars, convenience stores, fast‑food
restaurants, and, especially, liquor stores usually suffer from higher rates of
interpersonal crime (e.g., rapes and armed robberies) and property crime (e.g.,
burglaries and auto thefts) than complexes located
in exclusively residential
areas. Again, as mentioned earlier, the presence of public pathways
substantially adds to criminal opportunities. Even the location of public
transit stops such as bus stops can have an impact on criminal opportunities at
a site (see, e.g., Institute of Transportation Engineers 1985). Also, the
presence of public schools in inner city residential neighborhoods often is
strongly correlated with property crimes. Neighborhoods that have larger
proportions of owner‑occupied dwellings usually experience lower crime
rates than neighborhoods characterized by rental properties, mixed land use,
and public housing (e.g., Section 8 or other types of government subsidized
housing). These types of
factor‑related trends suggest that the practical application of
sociological crime theories and empirical research evidence is great. Expert
analysis of sociodemographic factors may be easily supported by an extensive
body of theory and research (Stark 1987; Shaw and McKay 1969; Chilton 1964;
Bordua 1958; Lander 1954).
THE NATURE AND PROFILE OF
THE OFFENDER
Generally, little is known
about offenders. As most experts who study crime know, the clearance rates for
certain types of crimes are extremely low. For example, according to latest UCR
data, the national clearance rate for the crime of robbery was 24 percent, and
the clearance rate for aggravated rape was 50 percent (regional clearance rates
for rape are substantially lower). Crimes such as murder have somewhat higher
clearance rates, about 65 percent nationally; however, because more than 50
percent of murder victims are either related to or acquainted with their
assailants, this higher figure is not surprising (Uniform Crime Report 1993).
Despite the generally low clearance rates, some offenders
are actu
ally arrested and convicted
for the crimes that they commit against
invited guests and patrons
to public or private establishments.
Interviewing an apprehended
offender can, in some instances, be of use
to the crime expert in a
civil liability suit. If an offender indicates, for
example, that he/she
selected a victim at a particular site because it
appeared that security was
weak, this information can be damaging for
the defendant (Brill 1990).
Obtaining a profile of the offender (or, at
least, a prior offense
history ‑ arrests and convictions) may be of use
in security negligence cases
for several reasons. j
Simply counting prior
murders at a site such as an apartment complex without examining what David
Luckenbill (1980) refers to as the "murder transaction" (the
relationship between the offender and the victim) often can result in a
"false" count of murder (p. 276). If several stranger‑opportunity
murders have occurred in an apartment complex with no apparent concern on the
part of management to provide minimum security measures,, the past number of
such offenses becomes extremely important from a crime foreseeability
standpoint (Thornton et al. 1991).
On the other hand, domestic
or acquaintance‑related assaults, rapes, and even homicides may fall
outside the parameters of crime foreseeability in third‑party liability
suits. For example, a disgruntled boyfriend who stalks his girlfriend to a
place of business and then assaults her would probably not be in the same crime
foreseeability category as a patron who is assaulted by a stranger in the same
place of business. Both crimes violate the same criminal codes, and the
offenders can be charged and arrested with the same violent crime. From a civil
liability standpoint, however, it is not reasonable under most situations to
hold the business owner responsible for the domestic assault (recall the
impending assault doctrine). He or she, given no warning, could not reasonably
foresee that such an offense might occur at the place of business.
Recent research on workplace
violence indicates that employers are increasingly legally obligated to protect
employees, especially women, who have been repeatedly
threatened or harassed on the job by exspouses or ex‑boyfriends (or
by other employees). Documented repetitive behavior in the form of threats,
stalking, surveillance, and the like can signal to the employer that potential
assault or worse is possible at some point in the future (Thornton, Voigt, and
Wallace 1994).
Certain types of
particularly heinous or dangerous offenders who have severe character disorders
or mental illnesses (e.g., antisocial personality, conduct disorders, or
psychoses) or who otherwise commit bizarre, one‑of‑a‑kind types
of offenses (e.g., rampage or mass murders) present threats to public or
private establishments that cannot reasonably
be predicted or deterred by usual security methods. It would not have been
possible, for example, for McDonald's management in San Ysidro, California, to
have predicted that James Huberty would murder 21 people at their place of
business in 1984. In fact, Lopes v.
McDonald's (1987) summary judgment was upheld for the defendants on the
basis that mass murder is not foreseeable, there was no duty to prevent
unforeseeable events on the part of McDonald's, and any breach of duty in
failing to employ arced guards was not a proximate cause of injuries and death
to customers.
CASE ULUSTRA77ON:
FORESEEABILITY OF CFO= BY
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS
In this case, we were
retained by the attorneys for the defendant, who was the manager of a multiple
apartment complex for a large elderly population. The granddaughter of an
elderly woman, while visiting her, was dragged from the complex parking lot into
a back woods bordering the complex The young woman was raped and murdered. The
plaintiffs (the woman's family) alleged that security was inadequate for what
they believed to be a relatively high crime area. They believed that the crime
should have been foreseen by the management and that measures should have been
taken to prevent the crime.
In our crime analysis, we
found that the complex, including the surrounding area, was a relatively low
crime area. We also uncovered that the management, irrespective of the
relatively low crime levels, did evolve a solid security plan. A security guard
was hired to patrol both inside the complex and outside in the parking lot.
Trees and shrubs in an adjacent lot had been cut down in order to increase
visibility. Lighting was installed in the parking lot. A back fence was not
there at the time of the offense but was erected immediately after the crime
occurred. Whether the back fence could have prevented the crime in question is,
of course, debatable.
Upon investigation, we found
that the offender in this case had been apprehended. The offender himself was
also a guest of one of the tenants of the apartment complex. It was further
uncovered that the offender had an extensive history of a mental disorder
(antisocial personality disorder) of which violent outbursts were symptomatic.
He had been charged with murder (of a young mother), attempted murder (of a 3‑
and a 6‑year‑old), and two prior rapes, for which he was unable to
stand trial and was judged mentally incompetent and committed to a state
mental hospital, where he stayed for ten years. He also attempted to kill one
of the orderlies in the hospital where he was committed. The man was released
by a psychiatrist and judged to be not dangerous just one week prior to the
rape‑murder incident.
The victimization of the
young woman was certainly tragic. Given the circumstances of the case, however,
the crime could not have been foreseen or reasonably prevented by the
management of the. apartment complex. The case was settled and never went to
trial.
THE NATURE AND PROFILE OF THE VICTIM
Criminologists only recently
have developed an interest in the victims of crime. Typologies of victims
normally have one or two fundamental bases or variables, specifically the
relative responsibility of the victim for the crime (i.e., to what degree is
the victim culpable for the actions of the offender) and the relative
vulnerability of the victim to crime (i.e., what social conditions or
environments lead to more or less risk of crime for the person). Using these
two variables (responsibility and risk), criminologists attempt to explain the
dynamic and varied relationship between the criminal and the victim (Voigt et
al. 1994:101‑103).
Complete innocence is the
most commonly accepted category of victimization. It includes people who did
nothing that conceivably could have elicited criminal action. They have no
culpability for' the crime. Unintentional facilitation is unwittingly,
carelessly, or negligently making it easier for a crime to occur, such as
leaving car keys in the ignition of a car or leaving a door to an apartment
unlocked. If carelessness increases the likelihood of crime and there is a
reasonable presumption that the crime could have been prevented, does the
victim bear some small social, if not legal, responsibility for the crime? Some
say yes; considering that nearly 50 percent of burglaries take place without
any forcible entry, the victims, if even unintentionally, establish themselves
as easy marks.
Victim precipitation, on the
other hand, occurs when a person willfully initiates the encounter with the
eventual offender, directly enticing, challenging, insulting, provoking, or
even initially assaulting the person. Victim precipitation is most common in
homicides and aggravated assaults. It is estimated, for example, that about 20
percent of homicides involve prior provocation from the victim (Wolfgang 1958;
Bordounis 1974).
CASE ILLUSTRATION:
DhOe att DOES THE USE OF NEE
CONSTITUTE VICTIM PRECIPITATION?
The attorneys for the
plaintiff retained us as consultants for this case. The case involved a
multiple list of defendants, including a hotel, a city park, a private security
company, and a travel magazine, to name just a few.
A woman accompanied her
husband on a business conference trip. While the husband attended the
conference, the woman used the time for sightseeing. She noted a travel
magazine advertisement for a well‑known park in the tea' her checking
with the hotel concierge regarding the relative safety and general directions
to the park, she hailed a taxi cab and by 10:30 Am. was dropped off at the
park, where she planned to take pictures. She had received no warning from
anyone in the hotel ‑ nothing regarding the relative safety of the park
was cited in any of the magazines or brochures advertising the park.
This particular city park
was regarded as s very high crime rate area. The Park borders on a public
horsing development that also experiences among the highest crime rates in the
city. The park was patrolled by only two security officers, who worked for a
private security company that was contracted by the city to secure the park
Evidence suggested that the two guards were asleep in an adjacent building at
the time of the incident.
While the woman was exploring
the park, a youth attempted to rob her
using a gun. When she
reached into her purse to hued over her wallet, she pulled out a Mace ejector
and sprayed the assailant in the face. Startled by the Mace, the youth pulled
the trigger and shot the woman in the head, lolling her. He fled into the
adjoining housing development, screaming that he did not mean to do it and why
did the woman spray him! He hid until he finally was convinced by family
members to give himself up.
The attorneys for one of the
defendants alleged that, had the woman not used the Mace, she might have been
alive. This argument, however, was not successful. The case was very, complex
and long. The litigants in the case settled with the victim's family for an
undisclosed amount of money.
The case included a wile
range of experts and was mainly argued using the totality of circumstances
approach. More specific data on crimes perpetrated against out‑of‑town
tourists were utilized in the case. The consultants were asked to conduct
literature reviews and original research studies on the correlation between the
use of Mace and homicide. No conclusive evidence was obtained. No scientific
research had been done on this topic. According to the "common
wisdom" of police officers (based on interviews at select polite
departments in major cities), Mace seems to offer a false sense of defense or
safety and may, indeed, be more of a hazard than a help. Its use could not be
considered, by any stretch of the imagination, as an act of victim precipitation.
This information was useful in deflating the arguments of the opposing sides.
A SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINAT1ON:
SOME CONCLUDING IRKS
Premise liability often is
difficult to evaluate. It always involves an act or event, its relationship to
a particular space, and the degree to which the owner or manager of the space
and the victim are, in part, responsible for the unfortunate occurrence. The
ironic and debunking nature of sociological thought is aptly suited to this
type of case.
A sociologist and
criminologist imagines a world where a single act or event is embedded in a
complex array of spatial, temporal, historical, and interpersonal contingencies
and conditions. It is a world where causality and liability are not readily
discernable but might reveal themselves through informed speculation, a
willingness to dig for seemingly unrelated patterns and occurrences, and a
little luck. Black and white, good and bad, and other binary styles of
reasoning rarely work in this world. It is, more often than not, a gray world
where no one is simply liable or innocent, but shades of both. It is, in short,
a sociological world.
We close on a practical
note. It frequently is observed that expert witnesses use the good ideas of
other sociologists and criminologists found in papers, books, and journal
articles to develop and argue their opinions. It has been our experience,
however, that expert witnesses often are able to contribute to their
disciplines.
Criminologists, who work as
experts, often have access to potential research data that otherwise would be
impossible to obtain. The results of research conducted in connection with
developing a case (e.g., analysis of police reports, supplemental surveys,
content analysis of documents, evaluations, outcome assessments) offer a rich
source of theoretically and methodologically significant information. The work
of many "experts" has not enjoyed the status of legitimacy accorded
traditional academic research and, therefore, largely has been ignored on the
assumption that applied research does not represent a high level of commitment
to "theory and methods." Given the increased pressure placed by
courts (especially since the U.S. Supreme Court decision Daubert u. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. [19931) for experts to
scientifically justify their positions, we feel this charge is unfounded. We
suspect that the collected works of practicing criminologists is both extensive
and significant in terms of its contribution to the field of criminology, and
it is not easily separated from more traditional "pure" research
activities.
1. We both have a doctorate in sociology with a
concentration in criminology and research methods.
Z. In Las Vegas, 70 percent of all premise liability cases
are casino related.
3. The case Isaacs u. Huntington
Memorial Hospital (1985) serves as the fountainhead of the totality of
circumstances rule of crime foreseeability. The
plaintiff; a doctor, was shot in the physician's parking lot at a major
hospital in what was considered a "high" crime area. At the nearby
emergency room parking lot, large
numbers of interpersonal crimes had occurred, and security
guards patrolled the parking area. The emergency room was open around the clock
and attracted a parade of drunks, drug addicts, and assorted criminal types.
Isaacs was shot by as assailant
near his car in the physician's parking lot. The court
rejected any type of prior similar crimes argument because it would, in their
opinion, discourage landowners from improving their security until the first
victim had been attacked (Tom on Torts 1993:357).
4. Local police data are not to be confused with data from
uniform crime reports (UCR). Although local police data provide the basis for
the UCR, it is more comprehensive and more detailed, offering specific information
such as the enact time, and the district and address of the occurrence. In
addition, a wider range of crimes are recorded, not just index crimes
Definitions or codes associated with crimes are bate on local and state codes,
not the general or standard codes used by the UCR.
5. In our report, we put a lot of emphasis on the prevention of domestic violence. Morally, we feel thin is as important area of crime that must be addressed. We feel it is important to include even in evaluations that target nondomestic crimes. It is important to keep in mind that domestic violence impacts the general perceptions of dangerousness held by residents of housing developments and by the public at large, who often cannot distinguish between stranger‑ or domestic‑related crimes. The prevention of domestic violence can have significant effects on overall perceptions of crime and safety.
6. The importance of the demographics of a community or
neighborhood cannot be underestimated from a security standpoint. We have
conducted social‑demographic and crime analyses of areas for developers
during their planning stages. If it is found that there are a large number of
urban crime risk factors at a proposed location for a business, either stricter
security measures must be incorporated into the plan or the business may be
relocated in a safer environment.
7. We are not saying that there is a relationship between
mental illness or disorder and criminality per se. We realize, of course, that
the two concepts are largely unrelated (e.g., Monahan and Steadman 1984). There
is, however, evidence to suggest a relationship between certain types of mental
disorder (e.g., sociopathy or psychopathy, child conduct disorder DSM‑III‑R,
Antis II, Cluster B, 301.70) and predisposition to violence. Sums individuals
have a higher base rate of violence than "normals" (e.g., Hare 1983;
Hall 1987) and are overrepresented in the commission of much violent
interpersonal crime including sadistic rapes, murders (particularly serial
murders or murder rampages) and other unpredictable, impulsive crimes (Robins
1966; Lewis 1989; Holmes and DeBurger 1988; Voigt et al. 1994). Thus, although
mental illness and crime are largely unrelated, what makes matters difficult is
that they are not completely unrelated.
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Brooding, J. 1974. A Class
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Brill, W. H. 1990, November
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Crime In and Around
Residences. Washington,
DC: Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Brill, W. H. 1972.
Innovation in the Design and Management of Public Housing: A Case Study of
Applied Research, paper presented at the Environmental Design Research
Conference, University of California, Santa Monica, CA.
Brill, W. H., &
Associates, 1978. Phipps Plaza South
Safety and Security Analysis and Recommendations. Annapolis, MD: Department
of Housing and Urban Development.
Brill, W. H., &
Associates. 1975. Housing Management
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Housing and Urban Development.
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