What transforms a hypothesis into an accepted scientific belief is the process of testing which was claimed to follow by the hypothetico-deductive model of justification. This part of the scientists' activity was often referred to as the "context of justification" and it is often distinguished from the process by which the scientist formulates the hypothesis in the first place, which is called the "context of discovery." Since only the context of justification makes a hypothesis scientific, only it is relevant to the philosophical account of the rational grounds (or basis or "warrant") for scientific belief. Generally members of the consensus tended to relegate the context of discovery to the personal, and often idiosyncratic psychological factors which characterized particular historical human scientists, accounts of which may be psychologically or historically interesting, but which are irrelevant to the philosophical account of how a hypothesis becomes a part of science. The philosopher is interested only in the "logic" by which a scientific belief comes to be warranted, not the psychological or historical process which led to its formulation in the first place. Thus the distinction between context of justification and context of discovery was also an essential element of the empiricist consensus in philosophy of science.