by: Heather Arnett
The British campaign in the South during the Revolutionary War is a prime study of contrasting tactics, military groups, and landscapes. The major battles in New England, with George Washington at the helm of the Continental Army, received the most attention, and, unfortunately, most of the credit for America’s independence from Great Britain. The Southern campaign had to be fought in a more informal way, with very little European grandstanding and pomp on the battlefield. In order to win, the Americans went back to their colonial roots to accomplish victory in the only way they knew how – by hacking it out in the wilderness under commanders who knew the territory and the tactics suited to it. Partisan leaders like Francis Marion and the guerrilla warfare strategy they employed in South Carolina during the Revolution turned the tide towards an American victory.
I.
“We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again”
- Nathanael Greene1
Though the Northern battles of the Revolution gained more press and
fame, 80 percent of the war’s actions took place in the Southern states.2
The methods employed by both sides differed significantly in the North
and South. Northern armies generally followed the more traditional
European way of war. Soldiers would line up in their uniforms with
the large red X’s on their chests and fire one volley, retire to the back,
and another line would take its place and do the same. On the European
continent, soldiers used a combination of muskets, bayonets, and sabers
to fight with and utilized lightly armored cavalry and medium-weighted
field artillery. The infantry were extremely disciplined and skilled,
and their commanders relied on these abilities.3 With a few
exceptions, the battles in the North generally followed this model.
European cavalry simply did not work with the rugged terrain of America:
only two of the twenty-four British cavalry regiments that existed ever
set foot in the colonies. When horse and rider were used, they were for
pursuit and reconnaissance work. The artillery used in America had to be
smaller than the pieces in Europe in order to negotiate the terrain. The
heavy guns were too hard to navigate down the trails and over great distances.
In the North, there was an emphasis placed on more light infantry tactics
and open skirmishes, and both the British and Continental armies fought
in basically the same way.
Not only was the strategy different between the Northern and the Southern
campaigns, but the kind of war the Revolution was changed around the years
1780-1782 in the lower half of America. There was a real absence
of formal battles, with the major exceptions being Camden, King’s Mountain,
Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, and the culmination of the war at Yorktown,
Virginia, in 1782. Instead of “real” battles, the war in the South
consisted of dozens, perhaps even hundreds of skirmishes that are not even
named. The only way history has a record of these is through soldiers’
accounts long after the fighting took place.4
The most prominent difference between the Revolution in the North and
South is the kinds of troops engaged there. The North had Continental
soldiers and few militiamen. In the South, all kinds of Americans
fought, sometimes in concert with one another, sometimes not. The
Continental Army, militia from the states, and partisan fighters all took
their place as the combined force of America. The Continental Army,
the “real” Revolutionary army, was officially founded after the battles
of Lexington and Concorde in April 1775. Militiamen appeared in the
Boston area that were in the process of being enlisted by the Massachusetts
Committee of Safety. These men subsequently formed an actual army that
reported to the second Continental Congress. Congress, wishfully
thinking, set enlistment terms at eight months, or the end of the calendar
year. 5 Because of the prevailing fear of a standing army,
Congress only authorized another year after this, but after George Washington’s
defeat in New York in the fall of 1776, they approved a force of 88,000
men to enlist for three years or the war’s duration. The Continental officers
really started recruiting in the spring of 1777, and accepted “vagabonds,”
“strollers,” free African-Americans, and convicts. Very few artisans
or farmers joined the ranks.6 In order to fill the lines, the
government offered bounties and promises of land. After the fall
of Charleston, the number of Continentals in the South was small; there
may have been at most 1600 soldiers at the height of the campaign.7
Like the British troops of the same sort, the Continental army was filled
with “society’s losers.” According to John Adams, the regiments raised
in New England were the “meanest, idlest, most intemperate, and worthless”
men. In total, there never seemed to be enough ‘real’ troops, but
they provided the very core of the force and for the first time, symbolized
the nation. The Continental Army “was the United States”8
At the very heart of the patriot cause stood the state militias.
After 1776, the states revived conscription, and that meant that all males
between the ages of sixteen and sixty, except for government officials,
minorities, or students were required to enlist. For instance, North
Carolina divided up its state into five districts and the men into classes.
Men over fifty were not put on active duty, but the other four classes
had enlistment rotations of six months.9 The militia, put simply,
was made up of part-time soldiers, and to the dismay of Continental commanders,
seemed to have been subject only to state authority. These men were
farmers, shopkeepers, and artisans by trade who were often swayed to join
up through fat bonuses.10 Unlike the Continentals, who were
mostly young and unmarried, militiamen had wives and families to worry
about. Farmers among them had to tend to their fields and animals, especially
around spring harvest. Colonial women were often as tough as their
men were, but even with children they could not run a farm by themselves.11
In general, the militia was never fairly judged. They were thought
to be cowardly, inefficient, and worthless. The conflict between
so-called ‘regular’ troops and militia began with the French and Indian
War. Jealousy raged on both sides-- regulars could not fight like
the Indians and were inadequate on the frontier, and militia did not have
the formal training to be thought on par with their counterparts.
This difference continued into the Revolution, with militia enlistments
conveniently running out on the eve of battle and desertion was common
due to personal and economic woes.12 Even though Nathanael
Greene, in referring to the American militia, said to Daniel Morgan that
“militia are always unsuspicious and therefore more easily surprised.
Don’t depend too much on them,” those same men were to form the core of
one of the most successful military victories in American history – the
Battle of Cowpens.13
The Battle of Cowpens was the first instance that a commander combined
the Continentals with the militia successfully. Brigadier Daniel
Morgan used the militia’s ability in aimed fire, taking cover, and general
agility combined with the Continental’s bayonets and discipline to create
quite a match for Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton and his Green Dragoons.14
Morgan’s army was, in truth, inferior in equipment, numbers, and skill.
Both armies contained around 1,100 men, but Tarleton had three trained
regiments and cavalry units to Morgan’s one. The battlefield was
in open woods with trees with no underbrush and no swamp or river to the
rear. It was aptly called ‘Cowpens’ because it was a place to keep
cattle.15 A message was sent from Nathanael Greene to Daniel
Morgan referring to the coming conflict: “Colonel Tarleton is said to be
on his way to pay you a visit. I doubt not but he will have a decent
reception and a proper dismission.”16
Daniel Morgan possessed an acute understanding of his troops’ limitations,
both physical and psychological. He had confidence in his regulars,
and knew how to handle his militiamen as well, but most importantly, he
predicted how the enemy would fight. His plan was genius in its simplicity.
He divided the army into three parts. The first line would be the
militia to receive the first shock of battle. The sharpshooters among
them could use the trees to steady their arms, and altogether their instruction
was to fire two volleys, then retire around the back of the whole force.17
The second line was made up of 450 Continentals on a low hill that overlooked
the field. They were instructed to wait until the British were within
range, fire two rounds, and retreat to the rear by their left flank much
like the first line. The third and final line was the cavalry that were
hidden behind another hill to the rear.18 After the plan was
set, Morgan readied his troops. To make sure they were excited and
fearless, he yelled from the top of lungs “They give us the British halloo,
boys, give them the Indian halloo, by God!” Then commenced a huge
Indian war whoop from all of the men.19 Colonel Tarleton was too
eager to get to the fight, and he fully expected to win. He foolishly awoke
his men before dawn and marched them forward without much rest. He
then sent the Legion cavalry at the American first line, and the men did
their job and fell back as told. The mounted men were shaken by the first
volley but surged ahead. Tarleton formed a standard battle line,
with infantry in the middle, dragoons on both wings, and a Highland regiment
in reserve. His men rushed at the American second line, which simply
and calmly fired shot after shot into the ranks. The Highlanders
were moved against the American right flank. Sensing a victory, the
British continued forward, but the rebels about-faced and sent a volley
into the troops. At the same time the infantry were firing, the American
cavalry and the original first line struck at the redcoats from their flank.
Cowpens was a complete and decisive victory for the rebels. Of
the 1,100 British soldiers, 930 of them had been killed, wounded, or captured.
The American force only lost 70, either killed or wounded.20
It was the patriots’ best fought battle, and referred to as “the most extraordinary
event of the war.” Cowpens was, quite possibly, the major turning point
in the Southern campaign, and most notably, a victory with combined regular
and militia forces.21
II.
“The whole Country is in Danger of being laid Waste
by the Whigs and Tories who pursue each other with
as much relentless Fury as Beasts of Prey”
-Nathanael Greene22
Along with the Continental Army and the state militias, the other major
component of the American force in the South was the partisans. Unlike
the two other groups, they were subject to no real authority.
In fact, they probably had less to do with the independence ideology than
any other group. The issues became personal. The war in the
South was more of a civil war, with brother fighting against brother, than
a conflict with one known enemy. There was a large Loyalist population
in the Carolinas that resented the patriot activity in their area.
Each side started blaming the other for “alleged brutalities” against their
homes and families. Loyalists started grouping together to “settle
scores” with their Whig neighbors and taking goods in the ‘King’s name.’23
British commanders tried to pit American against American to win in the
South. The destruction of two Continental armies and the disappointingly
little support from the state governments spurred a move toward guerrilla
warfare.24 Most of the Revolutionary actions in South Carolina
had no names, their casualties were few, but the damage that was done ran
very deep because they involved both friends and family.25
The partisan/ guerrilla fighter in the Carolinas was by nature an Indian
fighter and hunter. They were used to defending their homes against
those intruders and surviving out on the frontier and backcountry.
Partisans usually only had their own personal arms and rode their own horses.26
The men were volunteers who knowingly served without pay, without a specific
time of service, and provided their own arms and transportation.
Unfortunately for the formal commanders, they came and went as they pleased,
making it hard to gather up a significant number when needed. No
two of them fought for the same reasons.27 The promise of plunder
held a strong attraction to the guerrillas. The armed forces at the
time paid very little, so partisans’ pay was supplemented with Tory goods.
Most Patriot leaders took a middle of the road approach when it came to
recruitment. They allowed minimum plunder to keep men, but not to
excess. Francis Marion limited the loot to horses and food, but James Williams,
another commander, publicly advertised that anyone who joined would certainly
be compensated for their service. Thomas Sumter often gave his men
property that could have been used for public good, especially if it came
out of a Tory estate.28
Partisans, as mentioned above, used their own weapons. Unlike
the formal armies of Europe, spears and pikes were seldom used, pistols
were uncommon, and there were little to no field artillery pieces.
The guerrillas thought bayonets were “better for roasting a fowl” than
for fighting with. Officers were the only men with swords, and even
then good ones were rare. Partisans were more likely to use something
with a blade more familiar to them – the hatchet.29 The most
common guns in the forces were “firelocks” and even these were not all
uniform. Rifles were ideally suited to Southern terrain but they were difficult
and expensive to produce. British ‘Brown Besses,’ with their small bullets
and no rear sights, more often than not fell into patriot hands.30
Guerrilla warfare, simply defined, is individual sniping, defensive
operations, hit and run missions, and firing from cover. Partisan
leaders struck blows at enemy supply lines or the troops themselves and
quickly retreated so that pursuit was impossible.31 The job
of the guerrilla fighter was not to win pretty battles in a dignified and
formal manner. They never tried to hold territory. They were
instructed to avoid open combat situations, wear down the enemy, cut off
supply routes, and most importantly, to hit their target and run fast to
avoid being pinned down. These groups were successful only if they
had a leader who understood their limitations and abilities instead of
trying to act like a ‘real’ army.32 As the Continentals suffered
defeat after defeat in formal battles, respect for European tactics quickly
declined. To their credit, partisans could shoot accurately, use
their weapons well, harass their enemies, and were masters of surprise
and improvisation on their makeshift battlefields.33
During the French and Indian War, those living out on the frontier
had to learn basic self-defense in order to survive against both the wilderness
and the Indians. The white men learned how to take cover, move silently,
shoot more accurately, and make surprise ambushes much like the Indian
tribes did. These abilities helped the colonists and the British
regulars win the war. Throughout the time of the Revolution, tribes
like the Cherokees and Catawbas were still raiding settlers in the Carolinas.
So it is no wonder that these tactics should come into play while outsmarting
another foe, the British, who did not pay too much attention to how to
fight out in the wilds while they had a chance.34 Horses played
a big role in the partisan success as well. The men were almost always
mounted and leaders had a hard time in persuading them to dismount long
enough to march distances through the woods. Horses were mainly used
for pursuit or flight, and the guerrillas almost always preferred to fight
on foot and with their bare hands.35
Partisan forces were largely made up of farmers and mechanics that
were used to doing things for themselves without the proper equipment.
The men were able to devise genius ways to deceive the enemy. When
Francis Marion and “Light Horse Harry” Lee were attacking Fort Watson,
Maham, an officer, proposed building a high, rectangular boxish tower of
green logs with rifles mounted on top. Soldiers could then take shelter
and command from within the British fort. In fact, Maham towers surfaced
later in many other sieges in the Revolution. Fire was also a friend to
the partisans. The same pairing of Lee and Marion took Fort Motte
by setting the roof of the main building on fire. They also were
apt to use fake or “Quaker” guns, which were nothing more than tree trunks
mounted on wagon wheels to intimidate the enemy.36
Leading the charge for the partisan movement were many talented strategists
and commanders. Francis Marion, Thomas Sumter, and Andrew Pickens
made up a trinity of South Carolinian guerrilla leaders. Francis
Marion, who will be discussed later in this paper, exemplifies the partisan
spirit and was a major player in stopping the British foray into the Carolinas.
Thomas Sumter was an aggressive, recklessly brave man who was a “natural
rallying point” for the rebels and had an aversion to authority and control.37
He lacked material support so he rewarded his men with slaves and other
items stolen from Loyalists’ homes. This became known as “Sumter’s
Law.”38 Andrew Pickens equaled Sumter in skill, daring, and
devotion, but less in creativity. Marion prowled inland from the
coast, Sumter took the middle, and Pickens rode in the western part of
South Carolina. Partisan troops fought successfully if they stuck
to the mission at hand and did not try to use European tactics. Taken
one by one, these Southern skirmishes amounted to little, but taken as
a whole, American victories in these scuffles slowed down Cornwallis’ plan
to conquer the South.39 What made all the difference, however,
were those special individuals that understood their men and their strengths
and weaknesses. Such a man as this was Francis Marion, the greatest
partisan leader in the South.
III.
“…but as for this damned old fox, the Devil himself
could not catch him!”
-Colonel BanastreTarleton40
Francis Marion was born in the winter of 1732 to Huguenot parents in
the Santee River region of South Carolina. It is written that he
was so small as a boy that he was not “larger than a New England lobster”
and could fit in the same pot. The first six years of his life were filled
with learning and work, but he had very little formal education until he
moved North to near Georgetown where he may have had more training.
Georgetown is a port city, and Francis was always fascinated with the sea.
He was fifteen when he boarded a boat headed to the West Indies, and on
the return trip a whale rammed the boat and caused it to wreck. Needless
to say, that was the end of any sailing ambitions for him. Marion
was twenty-five when he started his military career. The French and
Indian War had just begun and it had not reached South Carolina yet, but
Cherokees were already raiding along the backcountry. He and his
brother both enlisted in the militia infantry regiment on January 31, 1756.
His company disbanded due to the Treaty of Paris, but only after Marion
had reached the rank of First Lieutenant for his bravery against the Cherokees.
With no more action to take part in, Marion went back home to his plantation,
Pond Bluff, and as a planter, acquired wealth through his land.41
After a thirteen-year absence from the public eye, Marion returned
from Pond Bluff to serve in South Carolina’s First Provincial Congress
as a delegate from St. John’s Parish. This group did little except
prohibiting the selling of British goods. Even at this point in 1775,
the men still professed allegiance to the King. Of course, this attitude
changed after Lexington and Concord, so the Congress voted to raise two
regiments of infantry and one cavalry unit that were eventually to become
Continental soldiers. Francis became the Captain of the second regiment.
His first job was to recruit men for the cause, and his region was along
the Santee, Black, and Peedee Rivers. He was able to sign sixty men
and brought them back to Charleston to train them. His first mission
as an officer was to take Fort Johnson on James Island in the Charleston
Harbor to control the water traffic. He took part in fortifying Charleston
and helped drive the royal government out of the city.42
The physical characteristics of Francis Marion were not those of the
typical American handsome hero. He was described as lean, “swarthy”,
and short, with an aquiline nose, projecting chin, large high forehead,
and black, piercing eyes.43 His personality was full of contradictions.
One the one hand, he could be humane or even kind, but as a commander,
he was a disciplinarian to a fault. Marion was so strict that an
officer in his South Carolina regiment called him an “ugly, cross, knock-kneed,
hook-nosed son of a bitch.” His mixture of caution and daring and
his understanding of guerrilla tactics made him a veritable foe to the
British.44 He was forty-eight years of age when the Revolution
began – past the typical prime of a soldier. Whatever his personality
flaws may have been, Marion was a born leader and a model field commander
with excellent cavalry skills. He rode into the battlefield at the
head of his men, but like any other leader, rarely did any of the fighting
himself but instead directed the action in front of him with a “calm brilliance.”
What made Francis Marion so special was his handling of guerrilla warfare.
He and his men operated largely without any support, and they were all
unpaid volunteers and mostly untrained. The troops used whatever
weapon they could find, even if they were sabers made by a local blacksmith
or their own hunting rifles. In other words, nothing was uniform
about Marion’s partisan band.45 His territory was the Low Country
between the Peedee and Santee Rivers and no redcoat or Tory was safe.
He had so many spies and informers that hardly anything happened without
his knowledge. The area had perhaps more Loyalists than others, but
if a group of them assembled to cause trouble, they had no chance against
Marion’s force.46
Marion was the master of surprise in the Revolution, and twenty-three
of the sixty-five main operations in the South were complete surprises.47
One of the commander’s favorite strategies when pursued was to retreat
at his own pace until he came upon a stream running through the swamp.
After crossing it, he concealed men on either side under cover and waited.
When the enemy arrived and tried to ford the water, they would be caught
in the fire from the hidden men’s guns.48 If the enemy tried
to cross anyway, Marion and his men would have already moved on to another
position deeper in the swamp. The enemy would get tired of this cat
and mouse game and simply stop. The partisans were also known to
ride fifty miles at night just to attack a camp by surprise in the early
morning and fade back.49 His force was able to inflict many
casualties on the enemy quickly at short range; part of the men fought
mounted with sabers, while the main portion of them were on foot, attacking
with firearms like smoothbore rifles. Marion’s favorite ammunition
for this weapon was a multiple pellet because there was a good chance of
hitting several men at once. He also tricked enemies into traps,
leading them there with false information. He also made his force
seem smaller than it was to give the British a sense of false confidence
to swoop in and demolish them. Marion once used this tactic against
a Cherokee war party. He sent a deliberately small cavalry unit to
attack then apparently retreat in a panic. The Indians pursued and
were lured within point-blank range of the rest of the partisan force.50
The period between August of 1780 and August of 1781 contained most
of Francis Marion’s more well-known skirmishes as a guerrilla commander.
By this time, he had attained the rank of Brigadier General of the South
Carolina militia. He had instructions from his superiors to destroy
any boats along the Santee River to trap and destroy any British soldiers
there, so his band of men started the sixty-mile march towards the river.
General Horatio Gates had expected to win at Camden, South Carolina, but
this did not happen and Marion did not tell his troops for fear of losing
some to discouragement.51 Great Savannah was Thomas Sumter’s
old plantation, and Marion found out there were over a hundred American
prisoners being held there by thirty-six British guards. The British
captain Jonathan Roberts had no idea that the rebels were lying in wait
for them, so he foolishly stacked all the arms outside the house. Marion
planned his attack for right before dawn. On the morning of August
20, 1780, he sent Hugh Horry with sixteen men forward as a block, while
the rest of the troops attacked from the rear. A sentry started firing,
but Horry still led the charge down the lane to the house to get the weapons
before the guards could. At the same time, Marion’s men attacked
from the other side. The action took only minutes, but the Americans
counted only two wounded, while the enemy suffered twenty-six losses.
The band freed all 147 Continental prisoners. It was this event that
made Cornwallis stop and order an investigation of this little man and
his guerrilla force.52
A few days later, on September 4th, Francis Marion led his fifty-two
mounted men east and camped at Ports Ferry on the Peedee River. When
British captain Jesse Barfield learned of Marion’s position, he lined up
his Tory force and waited for an attack. Marion retreated in a confused
way that suggested fear, and set up an ambush at Blue Savannah. Barfield’s
men pursued but when they came upon the hidden troops, their discipline
broke. Rebels had come at them on their horses in full charge with pistols
and sabers drawn. The Tories’ surprise turned into fear, so they
immediately retreated into the swamps.53 Even though the attack
only wounded three, Marion’s success broke the Tories’ spirit east of the
Peedee River, and brought in another sixty men to double the fighting force.54
Later in the same month of September, on the 29th, at Black Mingo Creek,
Marion met up with Captain John James after his victory at Charlotte.
This added sixty riders to the guerrilla force. The combined troops
rode South towards Shepherd’s Ferry and met John Ball and his forty-six
Tories. Marion had planned a surprise attack at midnight, but a Tory
sentry heard horses’ hooves on the bridge and alerted the others.
Even though they had lost the surprise, Marion continued to move towards
a tavern and told the men to fight on foot.55 Unfortunately, Ball’s
men were set up in a field right in the Rebels’ path and held their fire
until they got to thirty yards away. Three officers were killed and a quick
and disorderly retreat followed by some of the partisans, but Captain James
led a cautious advance, and Captain Thomas Waites circled the tavern and
attacked the Tories there. Only 107 men were involved in the scuffle,
which lasted fifteen minutes, but sixteen Tories were dead or wounded and
the rebels acquired some needed goods. Included in the stash was
Ball’s horse. Marion renamed it ‘Ball’ and rode it for the rest of
the war.
Marion received instructions from General Gates to keep harassing the
British rear, and called together his militia and established a base at
Ports Ferry. On October 24th, he learned that Colonel Samuel Tynes’
Tories were camped at Tearcoat Swamp.56 One scout reported that the
men were just sitting around, playing fiddle or cards, or sleeping, so
Marion told his men to rest for a while and woke them up at midnight to
start a fast march towards the Tories. He led them in a frontal assault
with cavalry on either flank, with the men “whooping, hollering, shooting,
and slashing” the enemy. Most of the Tory force fled, and the other
forty-three who did not make it that far offered little resistance.
Because of this skirmish, men spread stories about Marion and many of Tyne’s
men later joined up with the Rebels.57 Following that battle,
Cornwallis gave Tarleton permission to track and destroy Marion and his
men. After following the guerrillas for seven hours through the swamps,
Tarleton unknowingly gave him his nickname, the Swamp Fox.58
After a failed attack at Georgetown, South Carolina, Marion and his
troops marched to meet British Major Robert McLeroth between Charleston
and Winsboro. The partisan force of nearly 700 mounted men came into
contact with the Tories just above Halfway Swamp on December 12-13, 1780.
The British pickets were driven in, and their rear guard attacked, so McLeroth
was forced to take a defensive position. With his path blocked, the
British Major sent a flag to protest the rebels’ shooting of the pickets
and dared Marion to meet him out in the open. To this, Marion replied that
as long as the British kept burning houses and raiding, then he would keep
firing at the pickets. He sent word to the British side that “if
Major McLeroth wishes to see mortal combat between teams of twenty men
picked by both side, I will gratify him.” The challenge was apparently
accepted, and both sides chose men, but on the Major’s orders, the redcoats
marched off the field. He was merely stalling for time.59
In early 1781, Marion assisted “Light Horse Harry” Lee at Fort Watson
on April 23rd and Fort Motte on May 12th. His men occupied Georgetown
on May 28th, and supported American troops at Augusta and ninety-six.
Marion’s men came under the order of Thomas Sumter and suffered in a skirmish
at Quinby Bridge on July 17th. In August, American Colonel William
Harden tried to settle a Tory uprising of 450 men led by British Major
Thomas Fraser, but needed Marion’s help. So the guerrillas marched
100 miles, mostly at night undetected and met Harden on August 13th.
Marion set up an ambush on the causeway that led to Parker’s Ferry and
sent some horsemen to lure Fraser into the trap. Fraser took the
bait and charged in. His men found themselves in front of fierce
buckshot fire, tried to fire back, but were overcome when the Marion’s
cavalry came up to meet the other partisans. The Americans killed
or wounded 100 Tories without losing any men, but their ammunition was
nearly exhausted so they did not pursue but marched to join Nathanael Greene
at Eutaw Springs.60 Eutaw Springs was the last major battle
in the South. The rebels lost, but they forced the British to withdraw
from Charleston.
In the summer of 1781, it became apparent that America would win the
war. Tories without deep feeling were willing to change sides if
they were not punished. Francis Marion negotiated a treaty with the
Tory leader Major Ganey that allowed a number of Tories to live at home
as neutrals with no penalty. South Carolina governor John Rutledge
also passed a proclamation that gave any Tory a full pardon and citizenship
if they volunteered in the state militia for six months. Many Tories
took advantage of this.61
Francis Marion came home to Pond Bluff to find it and all of his belongings
destroyed. He had served without pay for three years. The South
Carolina senate eventually gave him a seat in the assembly and a gold medal.
For the rest of his life, he was commandant at Fort Johnson for pay of
$500 a year, but resigned when he married at the age of fifty-four.
The excitement of the Revolutionary War never left Marion. He would
take his wife and mule to wander over the hills overlooking the Santee
to visit his old haunts and to relive his exploits. He grew old gracefully,
as folk hero in his own time and as a politician until his retirement from
public life and his death at age sixty-three on February 27th, 1795.62
Even though Marion’s military service in the Revolution only spanned
three years, his life has become a mixture of fact and fiction. His
first published biographer, Mason Weems, probably started the legend, calling
Marion a “celebrated partisan officer,” and pictured him as the “Robin
Hood of the Revolution.”63 William Cullen Bryant even wrote
the “Song of Marion’s Men”: “Our band is few but tried and true/ our leader
frank and bold/ The British soldier trembles/ when Marion’s name is told.”
Robert D. Bass probably put it best when he described the Swamp Fox as
“neither Robin Hood nor Chevalier Bayard. He was a moody, introverted, semiliterate genius who rose from private to Brigadier General though an intuitive grasp of strategy and tactics, personal bravery, devotion to duty, and worship of liberty.”64
The Revolutionary War in the South was of extreme importance to winning
the war against the British as a whole. The cause in the South received
little aide from the Northern colonies, but managed to end the conflict.
It was a brother against brother, bloody, and vicious civil war. Continental
leaders that took on state militias and partisan leaders and their guerrilla
tactics led the colonies to victory, fighting the only way they knew how--the
American way. Officers like Marion, even though they were not involved
in the major European-type battles, will live on as the men who did the
little things that made all the difference.
Notes
1 Lucien Agniel, Rebels Victorious: The American Revolution in
the South, 1780-1871, (New York: Ballantine, 1972): 125.
2 Jac Weller, “Irregular but Effective: Partizan Weapons Tactics
in the American Revolution, Southern Theater,” Military Affairs 21, (Autumn
1957): 118.
3 Ibid., 119.
4 Don Higginbotham, The War for American Independence, (New York:
Macmillan, 1971): 362.
5 John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign
in the Carolinas, 1780-1782, (University: University of Alabama Press,
1985): 44.
6 Ibid., 45.
7 Ibid., 49.
8 Ibid., 50.
9 Ibid., 51.
10 Mark Mayo Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution,
(New York: McKay, 1966): 707.
11 John Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American
Revolution in the Carolinas, 1780-1782 (University: University of Alabama
Press, 1985): 182.
12 Robert C. Pugh, “The Revolutionary Militia in the Southern
Campaign, 1780-1781,” William and Mary Quarterly 14, (April 1957):156.
13 North Callahan, Daniel Morgan: Ranger of the Revolution, (New
York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1961).
14 Weller, “Partizan Tactics”, 129.
15 Lt. Col. Joseph B. Mitchell, Decisive Battles of the American
Revolution, (Greenwich: Fawcett, 1962):181.
16 Callahan, Daniel Morgan, 202.
17 Mitchell, Decisive Battles, 182.
18 Weller, “Partizan Tactics”, 130.
19Agniel, Rebels Victorious, 99.
20 Mitchell, Decisive Battles, 184.
21 Callahan, Daniel Morgan, 202.
22 Pancake, Destructive War, 73.
23 Higginbotham, War for Independence, 360.
24 Ibid., 362.
25 Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse, 105.
26 Weller, “Partizan Tactics”, 120.
27 Jac Weller, “The Irregular War in the South,” Military Affairs
24, (Autumn 1960):135.
28 Weller, “Partizan Tactics”, 136.
29 Weller, “Partizan Tactics”, 121.
30 Ibid., 122.
31 Ibid., 123.
32 Bruce Lancaster and J.H. Plumb, The Book of the Revolution,
(New York: Dell, 1958): 295.
33 Weller, “Partizan Tactics”, 124.
34 Ibid., 123.
35 Ibid., 123.
36 Ibid., 128.
37 Lancaster and Plumb, Book of the Revolution, 295.
38 Henry Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution
in the South. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981):
80.
39 Lancaster and Plumb, Book of the Revolution, 295.
40 Boatner, Encyclopedia, 677.
41 Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox, (New York:
Crowell, 1973): 11.
42 Ibid., 7-11.
43 Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown, 69.
44 Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse, 181.
45 Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown, 69.
46 Weller, “Irregular War”, 135.
47 Weller, “Partizan Tactics”, 126.
48 Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown, 69.
49 Ibid., 70.
50 Weller, “Partizan Tactics”, 126.
51 Boatner, Encyclopedia, 449.
52 Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse, 183.
53 Ibid., 184.
54 Boatner, Encyclopedia, 82.
55 Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse, 191.
56 Boatner, Encyclopedia, 1092.
57 Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse, 245-246.
58 Boatner, Encyclopedia, 677.
59 Boatner, Encyclopedia, 476.
60 Ibid., 832.
61 Weller, “Irregular War”, 136.
62 Rankin, Swamp Fox, 290-296.
63 Higginbotham, War of American Independence, 361.
64 Boatner, Encyclopedia, 679.