France's Moral Sedan:
The Dreyfus Affair
by Donia Byrnes
Crisis after crisis embroiled France's Third Republic in the late nineteenth century, but none as far-reaching in its effects as the Dreyfus Affair. For more than a decade, the Affair dominated French political, religious and social life, divided the nation into Dreyfusards and Anti-Dreyfusards, and delayed both foreign and domestic programs. On the surface, the Dreyfus Affair seems of little consequence. In 1894, a young French army officer, Alfred Dreyfus, was tried "in camera" by court-martial and was found guilty of selling confidential military secrets to Germany. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on Devil's Island. However, there were two complicating factors: "Dreyfus was innocent, and he was a French Alsatian Jew." <1>
To understand how the Dreyfus Affair gained so much importance, it is necessary to look at political conditions in France during the nineteenth century. There were many different types of government Constitutional Monarchy, Republic, Empire - and within each, there were many different factions. The Right included the Army, the Monarchists, the French Catholic Church and the Anti-Semites, while the Left contained the Workers, the Republicans, the Protestants and most of the Jews. Some of the changes in government were accomplished by uprisings and violence, which created an atmosphere of hatred, dread and suspicion.
After the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, Alsace and Lorraine were ceded to Germany and over 5,000 Jews from these areas moved to Paris where the French people "perceived" them as Germans. <2> It was at this time that the wealthy Dreyfus family left Alsace and moved to Paris to retain their French citizenship and to escape the anti-Semitism of the German people. By the 1890s, the Jewish population had been gradually absorbed into all layers of French society - banking, commerce, manufacturing, liberal professions, and civil service. The French Jew of this period, born on French soil and educated in French schools, was totally assimilated into French culture and society, and considered himself a patriotic Frenchman. When anti-Semitic newspapers published by French Catholics appeared in 1892, they were ignored by the Jewish' population who did not realize that they were being used as scapegoats to restore pre-industrial power to the French Catholic Church. The Dreyfus Affair was an embarrass met it to the Jewish people, and they remained quietly in the background. None of them were prepared for the anti-Semitic attacks that arose and continued throughout the Affair. <3>
French patriotism and pride focused on its mighty and invincible army and on its country's status as a great power in Europe. When France was defeated by the Prussians at Sedan in 1870 and (lie emperor, Louis Napoleon, was taken captive, the French people felt their army had been betrayed. They blamed this humiliation on traitors in the army and diplomatic services and swore to seek revenge on them. The provisional government which was set up at this time, and which served through France's final defeat by Prussia in January 1871, was to become the Third Republic. <4>
Another event which added to the anxiety of the people was the formation of the Panama Canal Zone Company, organized to build a canal across Panama in May 1879. Many French citizens invested their savings in this company hoping to make a profit; however, bad management led to its bankruptcy. When it was disclosed that members of Parliament had accepted bribes to keep the company operating, the citizens were outraged. They directed their anger toward the financial promoters who had been hired to handle the actual bribery. A wave of anti-Semitism broke out when it became known that all of the promoters were Jews. <5>
It was in this atmosphere of suspicion, of treachery, of anxiety over the loss of personal savings, and of intolerance in religion that Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a wealthy Parisian Jew from Alsace, was arrested and accused of selling important military secrets to Germany.
The Dreyfus Affair began when Major Count Ferdinand Walsin-Esterhazy, commander of a battalion of the French Army stationed at Rouen, made contact with Colonel Max von Schwarzkoppen, German military attaché in Paris, on July 20, 1894, and offered to sell him secret French documents. The colonel was under orders of the German General Staff in Berlin and they ordered him to negotiate with the French Commander. On August 13, Esterhazy brought the Prussian officer a copy of the French general orders for the artillery in case of invasion and on September 1, he brought him a number of documents but he forgot to include the covering list or bordereau. The French Section of Statistics was aware of the German attaché's interest in French affairs through information received from their spy, Mme. Marie Bastian, charlady at the German embassy, who delivered the contents of their wastebaskets to Major Hubert Henry of the Second Bureau. In December 1893, the scraps had yielded information that Schwarzkoppen had been in possession of twelve detail maps of Nice from the "Scoundrel D." General Auguste Mercier, Minister of War, was anxious to catch the spy before news leaked out and discredited the Army. The general ordered the Chief of the Statistical Section, Colonel Jean Sandherr, to locate the traitor.
Finding it difficult to cope with his job due to an illness (which would result in death in three years) the colonel put Major Henry in personal charge of the case. There was strong motivation for the major to locate the traitor. A replacement would soon be needed for the ailing Sandherr and the officer who exposed the traitor would be the logical selection for this promotion. <6>
Major Henry was the son of peasants and had the opportunity to work his way tip in the army through the lingering democratic influence of Napoleon, through his bravery in battle and through his single-minded devotion to the army. Although Henry's relations with his fellow officers were fine during working hours, he was snubbed socially. The snubs vexed him, but he felt grateful that one officer-aristocrat, Esterhazy, occasionally invited him to dinner. Even after Esterhazy was transferred from the department, he kept in touch with the major and helped him with translations. This was unusual because of the sharp class distinction at the time and the marked distinction in their personalities. Esterhazy's background was distinguished, his financial difficulties were unending, and his behavior was unpredictable. By contrast, Henry was a model French officer, a good provider, and a reliable and hard working army man. When Esterhazy asked the Major to help him gain a permanent position on the General Staff, he was flattered. His pride was fully restored when Esterhazy introduced him to Edouard Drumont, the Catholic author and editor of the anti-Semitic paper La Libre Parole and Henry promptly adopted Drumont's religious and racial prejudice. <7>
While Major Henry was on leave in September 1894, a French agent brought the bordereau to the Statistical Section and gave it to Colonel Sandherr. Perhaps the course of history changed here because of Henry's absence. Had the major been there, he would have recognized Esterhazy's handwriting in the bordereau. He could have identified the traitor and received the promotion he wanted or he could have destroyed it and saved his friend. In either case, there would have been no Dreyfus Affair.
Colonel Sandherr met with his associates, Lt. Cordier, Captains Lauth and Gribelin and studied the bordereau which read:
Although I have no news that you wish to see me, nevertheless, I am sending you, Monsieur, some interesting information: 1. A note on the hydraulic brake or the 120 mm gun and the way in which this gun has behaved. 2. A note on the covering troops (some modification will be made under the new plan). 3. A note on a modification in artillery formation. 4. A note concerning Madagascar. 5. The projected Field Artillery Firing Manual (14 March 1894)
This last document is extremely difficult to explain and I can only have it at my disposal for a very few days. The Ministry of War has sent out a fixed number to the various corps concerned and the corps are responsible for them. Each of ricer holding one must return it after maneuvers. If, therefore. you wish to take from it whatever is of interest to you and then keep the original for me, I will take it back, unless you would prefer that I should have it copied in extenso and send you the copy.
I am just about to leave for maneuvers. <8>
It was apparent to these men that this particular bordereau was not an innocent list of items but an itemized list of secret military documents. It had been stolen from Colonel Schwarzkoppen. For over three years, the Section of Statistics had suspected that tile Colonel had a contact with someone on the French General Staff because maps, mobilization plans, and details of the Franco-Russian alliance had disappeared from headquarters' files. Also, French agents had gained possession of a note from Schwarzkoppen to Colonel Panizzardi, the Italian military attaché in Paris, which read, "Enclosed are 12 detail maps of Nice which the scoundrel D left with me for you." <9> Although several minor agents had been caught and convicted, the Bureau was under heavy pressure from the Minister of War to find the traitor.
Colonel Sandherr and his associates realized that only a member of the General Staff could have the information listed in the bordereau. Suspicion fell on the probationers, who worked temporarily in all branches of the General Staff before being assigned permanently to a particular Section. As the Colonel went down the list of probationers his eyes fell on the name Dreyfus and he remembered that he had opposed this officer's appointment because he felt that he had found the traitor. Sandherr called in handwriting experts to compare Dreyfus' handwriting with that of the bordereau. These experts differed in opinion -- Taysonnieres thought they were written by the same man, Charavay judged that it could have been written by the same man if he were trying to disguise his handwriting, and Pellitier stated that the bordereau was written by a different person. Colonel Sandherr interpreted this testimony to mean that the bordereau might have been written by Dreyfus. It was on this slender evidence that Captain Alfred Dreyfus was arrested on suspicion of treason on October 15, 1894, and imprisoned at Cherche-Midi. <10>
The army allowed news of the arrest to be leaked to the Parisian newspapers. The Catholic press led by Drumont and the Assumptionists printed poisonous, vicious and prejudicial editorials against Dreyfus and the Jewish people. They brought anti-Semitism to an explosive point and referred to Dreyfus as an agent of international Jewry and proceeded to convict the Captain before his trial. Due to the demands of the press, the Army was obliged to set an early date for the court-martial although their only evidence against Dreyfus was the bordereau. <11>
The War Minister's official observer at the trial, which was held "in camera" on December 19, 1894, in Paris was Major Georges Picquart. After the first day of the trial, the major believed that the Army would have to acquit Dreyfus for lack of evidence. Picquart did not realize that General Mercier and Major Henry had decided that Dreyfus would be found guilty. Henry testified that "an unimpeachable gentleman" had warned him that there was a traitor in the Ministry and that the traitor was Dreyfus. When the defense attorney, Demange, asked for the name of the accuser, Major Henry replied that it was an "officer's secret." The presiding judge allowed Henry to swear on his word as an officer that this person had told him that Dreyfus was the traitor. The trial continued in this manner. Army officers refused to answer the questions put by the defense attorney and the judge allowed them this privilege. When Demange objected to this procedure he was told that answers to his questions could involve international relations; therefore they could not be answered. <12>
With the help of a major on the General Staff, Marquis Mercier du Paty de Clam, General Mercier had fabricated a file on Dreyfus. It contained a "criminal biography of Dreyfus which purported to show that the Jew's whole military career had pointed to treason." Another document in the doctored file was a telegram sent to Rome by the Italian Attaché in Paris which had been intercepted and decoded by the General Staff. The original wire had read, "if Captain D. had no relations with you, a denial would be welcome to avoid press comment." However, du Paty had changed it to read, "D. arrested. Precautions taken. Emissary warned." These documents with a cover letter from General Mercier were placed in an envelope and stealthily handed to the judge by du Paty. Mercier's letter was a request for the judge to read all documents to his colleagues and to reseal the envelope before returning it to du Paty because of international implications. With this endorsement by the Minister of War the court-martial was unanimous in its verdict of guilty. After a public degradation, Dreyfus was shipped to Devil's Island and placed in solitary confinement for life. <13>
Because the false evidence prepared by Mercier and du Paty was hidden from the defense it was a violation of the Penal Code and therefore the trial was illegal. On the human and moral side, the Minister of War (the highest-ranking officer in the army) deliberately destroyed the honor of an innocent military officer to protect and improve his own personal position in government.
Although the general public felt that justice had been served, there were a few including his wife, his brother and his attorney who believed in the innocence of Alfred Dreyfus. Major Picquart had some reservations about the lack of evidence. When he was made head of counter-espionage at the Second Bureau his superiors asked him to try to uncover motives for the Dreyfus' treason. While Picquart never found any motives, he discovered other facts which led to a great change in his life and to a tumultuous crisis for the Third Republic. <14>
On March 15, 1896, a French intelligence officer procured a petit bleu, a blue-rolled special delivery post card, from the pocket of Schwarzkoppen's overcoat which was hanging in the cloak room of a Parisian restaurant. He immediately brought it to the Second Bureau because it was addressed to Major Esterhazy. Major Picquart was stunned by the contents:
Sir: I shall wait for more detailed explanation of the question in hand than you gave me the other day. Please let me have it in writing so that I can judge whether to continue my relations with the firm of R or not. C.
Picquart ordered a security check on Esterhazy. The Second Bureau agents discovered that the major was a rogue and a blackguard and was in financial difficulties. An officer in his current regiment reported that Esterhazy was unusually interested in confidential reports on guns and gunnery. When Picquart reported these finding to General Boisdeffre, Chief of the General Staff, the General sought to avoid another army scandal. He advised Picquart that he would get rid of Esterhazy and have him put on retired pay. <15>
In the meantime, Esterhazy had written several letters of application for a position on the General Staff. Picquart was amazed at the brazenness of the man; however, he realized that if the man was really a German agent and desperate for money, this job would give him access to confidential information to sell to Schwarzkoppen. In the routine check at the Second Bureau, Esterhazy's handwriting was checked against other writings brought in by spies. It proved to be identical to the handwriting of the bordereau. Picquart called Bertillon, the handwriting expert, to his office who confirmed that Esterhazy was the person who had written the bordereau. When Major Picquart reported his finding to his superiors, General Boisdeffre and General Gonse, he was told that the bordereau was part of a closed case and could not be used against Esterhazy. Major Picquart could not understand why his superiors refused to reopen the Dreyfus case when there was evidence to prove the innocence of a convicted man.
General Gonse told him to keep silent and no one would know. When Picquart said, "I do not know yet what I am going to do. But I will not carry this secret to my grave," his fate was sealed. Although held in abeyance, General Gonse signed an order transferring Major Picquart to the eastern border. <16>
In September 1896, L'Elair, an anti-Semitic newspaper, published an article, the purpose of which was to "stop once and for all rumors, conjectures, and misstatements" about the Dreyfus case. The article stated that secret diplomatic evidence had not been placed in evidence but had been secretly handed to the judge. According to L'Elair, this evidence contained the sentence, "Decidedly this beast of a Dreyfus has been demanding," and was positive proof of guilt. While some of the public agreed with the fact, there were many who questioned the illegal procedure. So once again, the pro- and con-Dreyfusards were stirred up and at odds with one another. <17>
On November 16, 1896, Major Picquart's orders were activated and he was sent to the eastern border, then to the Italian frontier, Algiers and finally to Tunisia. In April 1897, Picquart wrote a letter to the president of the Republic which stated that Esterhazy was the German agent rather than Dreyfus, that Dreyfus had been framed and that the evidence was in the files of the Second Bureau. This letter, he entrusted to Louis Leblois, his lawyer, to be given to the president upon Picquart's death. However, he gave Leblois permission to use the facts, as long as his name was not mentioned. The lawyer first divulged the story to the vice-president of the Senate, Auguste Scheurer-Kestner, who became interested. Soon many others like Georges Clemenceau, Jean Jaures, and Anatole France shared this interest and became Dreyfusards. <18>
By November 1897, some of the story was out. It was known that Picquart had discovered that the bordereau was written by Esterhazy and that there was other evidence linking Esterhazy to German agents. In his newspaper, L'Aurore, Clemenceau stirred up interest for a trial. When the trial was held on January 9, 1898, Esterhazy was acquitted and Picquart, the witness, was dismissed from the army. Clemenceau realized that the attitude of the War Ministry was suspicious and that something had to be done. <19>
As Clemenceau was pondering what to do, Emile Zola come into his office with an article to be published in L'Aurore. It was an "Open Letter to the President of the Republic." In the article, Zola accused by name rive generals and two other high-ranking officers of having deliberately framed Dreyfus at an irregular trial and of having knowingly acquitted Esterhazy, the guilty man. Clemenceau wanted to print it at once and he only made one change: the title became J'Accuse. The Socialist leader Jules Guesde called Zola's article "the most revolutionary act of the century." When J'Accuse appeared in L'Aurore on January 31, 1898, it was a sensation. In Paris more than 200,000 copies were sold. Once again, the city divided into Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. Many people who believed in the rights of the citizen now switched over to the Dreyfus side. Opposed to them were members of the military and the Catholics who felt that the honor of the army must be protected at any cost. <20>
Many people were surprised at Clemenceau's stand because he was a dedicated Revengist who believed that the Army must be preserved regardless of cost. However, he was a true son of the revolution and believed primarily in the basic rights of the citizen.
Zola and his publisher were charged with criminal libel and put on trial in February. Labori defended the author while Clemenceau defended L'Aurore. Neither lawyer really presented a defense; rather they attacked those who were participating in a miscarriage of justice. However, Clemenceau did have one memorable phrase. He called attention to the crucifix on the wall behind the judge and said, "Christ himself was the victim of a judicial error, yet there He is, hung behind the judge's back, no doubt so that they should not see Him." Both Zola and the manager of L'Aurore were sentenced to imprisonment and fines. <21>
It seemed like this brought the Dreyfus Affair to an end with the honor of the army winning out over the rights of the individual citizen. However, it proved to be the turning point toward justice.
When Godefrey Cavaignac became the new War Minister, he was determined to put an end to the Affair. lie believed that Dreyfus was guilty and on July 7, 1898, he rose in the Chamber and announced that he would read the three documents that were positive proof of Dreyfus' guilt. His text was posted on the country's 36,000 communes. On July 10, Picquart wrote a letter to the Prime Minister in which he stated that he could prove in court that two of the documents did not refer to Dreyfus and the third one was a forgery. Cavaignac ordered Picquart's arrest on the charge of revealing state secrets. <22>
In order to refute the charges made by Picquart, Cavaignac assigned Captain Louis Cuignet of the General Staff to study the documents and make sure of their authenticity. When the young captain reported that one of the documents had been forged, Colonel Henry was questioned by the Minister of War in the presence of the chief of the General Staff and his deputy. Henry admitted that he had forged the document. The press was notified of his confession and be was imprisoned in Mont Valerien. During the night, Colonel Henry slit his throat and was found dead the next day. It was later discovered that he had employed a character named Lemercier-Picard to help him with numerous forgeries. <23>
Colonel Henry's confession and suicide had far-reaching effects. Lemercier-Picard was found hanged in his room, Esterhazy fled to London, and both General Boisdeffre and Cavaignac resigned their posts. Furthermore, it caused many of the French people to question their Republican government; Dreyfus had been convicted on forged evidence in an illegally conducted trial; Esterhazy had been found innocent in spite of legal evidence against him; Henry had been made a national martyr for faking evidence against Dreyfus; Emile Zola had been found guilty for publishing these injustices. These events divided the people of France, increased the gulf between the Right and the Left, and added to the weakness of the Third Republic. <24>
It was at this time that Mine. Lucie Dreyfus petitioned for a revision of the verdict and the Criminal Branch of the High Court decided to review the case. The Chamber of Deputies feared that the Criminal Chamber would clear the name of the condemned Jew, so they had the case transferred to all three branches of the High Court by passing an unconstitutional law. However, they were thwarted in this attempt, because the Dreyfus file was examined, and it contained "373 documents with no evidence against Dreyfus and 50 crude forgeries." On June 3, 1899, the 46 justices annulled the Dreyfus conviction and ordered a new trial before the military court at Rennes. <25>
On the Sunday following the decision, there was a great demonstration in Paris. More than 100,000 workers, merchants, artisans and students marched through the streets in support of the Republic over the Army. This consolidation of the workers for the Republic was one of "the historic achievements of the Dreyfus Affair." The union of the Radical Republicans and the Socialists gave new life to the Third Republic. <26>
In the meantime, Major du Paty had been jailed for forging documents in the Dreyfus case, Picquart had been released from prison, and Emile Zola returned from his exile in England thinking that, at least, justice would gain a victory. <27> It seemed that the court material would be a mere formality, in which Dreyfus would be quickly acquitted. Picquart's testimony had been supported by Henry's confession, du Paty had admitted to forgery of documents in the case, and the High Court had thrown out the evidence of Dreyfus' original conviction.
However, adherence to the hierarchy of the military, rather than judgment on the basis of evidence presented, was the course followed by the judges at the Rennes court-martial in August 1899. General Mercier, the highest-ranking military officer, dominated the trial, and his junior officers, including the presiding judge, Colonel Albert Jouast, "obeyed his orders." Although the High Court had defined the relevant evidence to be investigated and had ruled that the trial be held in open court, Mercier was able to circumvent both of these rulings because of his eminent position in the army. This second court-martial was a reenactment of the first one. Once again, Mercier attempted to slip forged documents into the Dreyfus dossier, he refused to answer certain questions, and he rebuffed all challenges to his opinion. Although Colonel Jouast showed great respect for the military, he was quite the opposite with the Dreyfus defense attorneys, Labori and Demange. Rather than an investigation into the innocence of an accused traitor, it became a battle between the honor of the army and the rights of the citizen -- and the army won. On September 9, 1899, by a vote of five to two Dreyfus was found "guilty of treason, but with extenuating circumstances." His sentence was reduced to ten years in prison. <28>
With the exception of the army and the church, reaction in France and around the world was one of public outrage and disbelief: To Zola, "the verdict was a monstrous defiance of reason and justice;" to Clemenceau, there was "no security either for the liberty, life, or honor of citizens;" Governor Theodore Roosevelt commented, "You cannot benefit one class by pulling another class down;" the London Times called it, "the grossest and most appalling prostitution of justice;" the Daily Telegraph remarked, "This infamous judgment disgraces France, dishonors her Army . . . ;" and the Daily Mail wrote, "Rennes is France's moral Sedan." <29>
In the two decades preceding the Dreyfus Affair, France had felt that she was suffering from a humiliating defeat by Germany, and that only revenge by the Army could restore her importance as a Great Power. The nation's faith in its Army was badly shaken by the Rennes decision. Rather than improving France's image, the Army's injustice portrayed her as a nation torn apart by religious and military prejudices, that endangered equality and justice for all her citizens.
Premier Waldeck-Rousseau knew that a third court-martial would only support the first two, so he asked President Emile Loubet to grant a pardon to Captain Dreyfus. Many felt that he should not accept it, but should continue to fight. However, Dreyfus suffered a nervous breakdown after the Rennes trial, and his family and close friends advised him to accept the pardon. To the pardon he appended a note, drafted by Jean Jaures, which stated that he would continue to seek final judgment of his innocence. This was finally attained on July 12, 1906, when the three branches of the High Court of Appeals annulled the verdict of Rennes. It ruled that Dreyfus had been convicted in error, and that there was no evidence against the captain. Furthermore, it barred any future trial. Although 12-1/2 years had elapsed since the Dreyfus arrest, the Republic was Finally successful in attaining justice for an individual French citizen. Both Dreyfus and Picquart were rehabilitated in the Army, and the latter became Minister of War in 1908. <30>
In 1931, further proof of Dreyfus' innocence came to light when the posthumous papers of Schwarzkoppen were published. They completely vindicated Dreyfus of any involvement with the German attaché in Paris, and named Esterhazy as the agent who had furnished the embassy with the bordereau and other information. <31>
Although the Dreyfus Affair seems to convey a miscarriage of justice against one individual more than any other single event, it portrays the deadly rifts in France at this time. The sharp differences between the Army and French Catholic Church on one hand, and the individual citizen and the Republic on the other, was to have a strong influence on the future religious and political history of France.
One of the first institutions to be affected by the Dreyfus Affair was the Catholic Church. Although Pope Leo XIII had urged the French clergy to support the state, most of the leading Catholic Associations and the high clergy supported the military and were against the Third Republic. Between 1898 and 1905, the Republic took successive steps which led to final separation of state and church in 1905. <32>
Waldeck-Rousseau saw the Dreyfus Affair as a judicial scandal and the military intrigue as a political scandal. As soon as his government was formed, he proceeded against the military. He had the leaders of the plot arrested, tried, and imprisoned. Within a decade, the military was a rejuvenated and honorable institution. <33>
At times the Dreyfus Affair strained the Third Republic close to the breaking point, but it eventually strengthened: the workers and Republicans were consolidated, the purge of the army prepared it for 1914, the separation of church and state benefited both, and the rights of the citizens became firmly established.
Historians and journalists interpret the Dreyfus Affair in different ways: Michael Curtis, in his book Three Against the Republic, affirms that politically the Affair caused a shift to the Left and added Socialist support to government; J. Salwyn Shapiro states that the Affair restored the supremacy of the civil power to the Third Republic; Hannah Arendt sees the anti-Semitic phase of the case as a prelude to Nazism; Jacques Kayser sees it as a momentous political battle of the Reactionary Right against the Republic; and Dansette regards it as the cause of the separation of church and state in France. <34>
According to Douglas Johnson in France and the Dreyfus Affair, the following, although written much earlier, may also have some application to Dreyfus:
"There's more evidence to come yet, please your Majesty," said the White Rabbit, jumping up in a great hurry. "This paper has just been picked up."
"What's in it?" said the Queen.
"I haven't opened it yet," said the White Rabbit, "but it seems to be a letter, written by the prisoner - to somebody."
"It must have been that," said the King, "unless it was written to nobody, which isn't usual, you know."
"Who is it directed to?" said one of the jurymen.
"It isn't directed at all," said the White Rabbit, "in fact, there's nothing written on the outside." lie unfolded the paper as he spoke, and added, "it isn't a letter, after all: it's a set of verses."
"Are they in the prisoner's handwriting?" asked another of the jurymen.
"No, they're not," said the While Rabbit, "and that's the queerest thing about it." The jury all looked puzzled.
"He must have imitated somebody else's hand," said the King. (The jury all brightened up again.)
"Please your majesty," said the Knave, "I didn't write it, and they can't prove I did; there's no name signed at the end."
"If you didn't sign it," said the King, "that only makes the matter worse. You must have meant some mischief, or else you'd have signed your name like an honest man."
There was a general clapping of hands at this ...
From Alice in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll, first edition, 1865 <35>
Notes
1 Louis L. Snyder, The Dreyfus Case (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973), p. xxi.
2 Paula Hyman, From Dreyfus to Vichy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 14.
3 Michael R. Marrus, The Politics of Assimilation (London: Oxford Clarendon Press, 197 1) pp. 33-42.
4 Snyder, pp. xxi-xxii.
5 David Haworth, Panama (New York: McGraw Hill Book, 1966) pp. 96-98.
6 Nicholas Halasz, Captain Dreyfous (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1955) pp. 3-16.
7 Betty Schechter, The Dreyfous Affair (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965) pp. 11-15.
8 Snyder, p. 5.
9 William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969) pp. 49-50.
10 Ibid., p. 50.
11 Ibid., p. 52.
12 Ibid., p. 52.
13 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
14 Ibid., p. 55.
15 Schecter, pp, 62-66.
16 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
17 Halasz, pp. 68-71
18 Shirer, pp. 58-59.
19 J. Hampton Jackson, Clemenceau and the Third Republic (London: The English Universities Press, Ltd., 1959) pp. 112-114.
20 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
21 Ibid., p. 116.
22 Shirer, pp. 61-62.
23 Ibid., p. 62.
24 Ibid., p. 63.
25 Ibid., p. 63-65.
26 Halasz, pp. 209-210.
27 Shirer, p. 65.
28 Halasz, pp. 222-236.
29 Snyder, pp. 336-343.
30 Shirer, pp. 66-67.
31 Ibid., p. 67.
32 Adrien Dansette, Religious History of Modern France, II, translated by John Dingle. (New York: Herder & Herder, 1948) pp. 164-174.
33 Shirer, p. 73.
34 Snyder pp. 388-393.
35 Halasz, p. 234.